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Abstract 
This study investigates why there is a change in Turkish foreign policy in 2010s in 
the context of the Middle Eastern security complex through a “before-after” 
comparison. The main argument of the present research is that the change in the 
Middle Eastern regional security complex brought by the Arab uprisings, which is 
perceived and mediated by the Turkish foreign policy-makers through a foreign 
policy decision-making process, led to changes in Turkish foreign policy. In 
exploring this causal mechanism, the change in Turkish foreign policy is identified 
as adjustment, program, and problem and goal changes according to Charles F. 
Hermann‟s typology for foreign policy change in terms of outcomes. Then, the 
Regional Security Complex Theory is used as an instrumental theory to research 
the elements of the Middle Eastern security complex and the change in the 
structure. The analytical findings of the mentioned chapter demonstrate that there 
was internal transformation of the regional security structure through the change in 
the patterns of amity and enmity in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. Lastly, a 
foreign policy decision-making approach which concerns identification of the 
foreign policy problem and decision unit dynamics is employed in order to 
determine the role of the Turkish foreign policy leadership and decision-making. 
At this point, the empirical findings suggest that Turkish foreign policy-makers 
perceived developments and challenges in the regional security structure as a 
foreign policy problem, considered strategic beliefs and objectives as fundamental, 
and made decision for foreign policy change through “concurrence” within the 
single group decision unit based on groupthink. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Puzzle 
The Middle East has hitherto been a unique example of a conflict prone region. 
Although the regional security structure remained largely intact for some decades, 
the year 2011 marked the beginning of significant developments throughout the 
region. In fact, it was the outbreak of a regional phenomenon, i.e. the Arab 
uprisings, which brought major challenges not only to the countries experiencing 
the events, but also adjacent countries in the region. The extensiveness of these 
challenges and developments caused by the said uprisings triggered substantial 
changes in the regional security structure in its aftermath. 
Until the Arab uprisings, Turkey enjoyed rising prominence in the Middle 
Eastern regional affairs, particularly in the context of security affairs. With an 
apparently different foreign policy framework than those previously adopted when 
it was more reluctant to engage in Middle Eastern affairs to a greater extent, 
Turkey started to pursue a proactive and multi-dimensional foreign policy based on 
soft power in an effort to promote regional cooperation and stability from mid-
2000s onwards. Particularly between 2007 and 2011, by actively engaging in 
regional security matters through mediation, facilitation, and any available means 
and platforms for pushing cooperation and stability in the region, Turkey adopted 
an integrative and constructive foreign policy in responding to the problems and 
challenges in the context of the Middle Eastern security environment. 
However, proactive and multi-dimensional foreign policy of Turkey has been 
put into a serious test by the changing regional security structure by the outbreak of 
the Arab uprisings.
1
 The prominence of the regional security developments 
triggered a series of debates for Turkish foreign policy and its capabilities and 
limits. It quickly became evident that this change made the continuation of such 
policy gruelling, if not impossible. In other words, regional factors and 
developments that Turkey cannot easily control have made it clear that the Turkish 
foreign policy cannot be conducted as comfortably as it was in its pre-Arab 
uprisings fashion.
2
 On the other hand, the uprisings that posed serious challenges 
to Turkey‟s proactive foreign policy have provided new opportunities at the same 
time in its attempt to respond these challenges and overcome the limits inherent in 
                                                          
1
 E. Fuat Keyman and Sebnem Gumuscu, Democracy, Identity and Foreign Policy in Turkey: Hegemony Through 
Transformation (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 84. 
2 Baskın Oran (ed.), Türk Dış Politikası - Cilt III 2001-2012 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2013), 210. 
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new opportunities.
3
 Therefore, the transformation of the regional security context 
forces researchers to closely investigate the revisions and changes in Turkish 
foreign policy.
4
 The puzzle of this study starts from the point that Turkey has faced 
a challenge as regards whether, to what extent, and in what manner to change its 
foreign policy vis-à-vis pressuring regional developments. Having underlined the 
change in Turkish foreign policy, the investigation on the factors behind it remains 
crucial. 
1.2 Research Question and Aim 
The research question of this study is why there is a change in Turkish foreign 
policy in the context of the Middle Eastern security complex in early 2010s. The 
aim is to seek an analytical explanation of this question by conducting an 
examination of Turkish foreign policy before and after the change through 
applying Charles F. Hermann‟s model for foreign policy change in terms of 
outcomes. Within this context, the present study argues that change in regional 
security structure in the face of the Arab uprisings is the main determinant of a 
smorgasbord of changes in Turkish foreign policy. It further investigates the 
Turkish foreign policy leadership and decision-making as factor perceiving and 
mediating the source of change and leading to the outcome.  
In case studies, the research objective is not necessarily focused on the 
dependent variable, but it may alternatively be on the investigation of an 
explanatory variable in shaping the outcome.
5
 In this regard, although the 
specification of the outcome is still essential and will be carried out, this study 
primarily focuses on the explanation of the source of change and the intermediate 
step of leadership and decision-making. More specifically, its empirical analysis is 
directed towards the independent variable, i.e. source of change, and the 
intermediate step, i.e. foreign policy leadership and decision-making, rather than 
the foreign policy change itself. 
The empirical aim of this study is to develop an analytical explanation of the 
change in Turkish foreign policy in the context of the Middle Eastern security 
complex in 2010s. By applying the explanatory model of foreign policy change to 
a case study, it aims to contribute to the empirical study on foreign policy change. 
Besides, by adopting a before-after research design on the change in Turkish 
foreign policy, the aim is also to enhance policy evaluation research in this field of 
study. 
In addition to its empirical aims, the present study has theoretical motivations 
as well. The theoretical aim is to contribute to the study of foreign policy change. 
                                                          
3
 E. Fuat Keyman and Sebnem Gumuscu (2014), 88. 
4 Bülent Aras, „Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited‟, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 16/4 (2014a), 
407. 
5
 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), 80. 
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Taking insights from the earlier literature on foreign policy change to an important 
extent, it provides a functional alternative explanatory model of foreign policy 
change, which generates its essence partially from Jakob Gustavsson‟s three-step 
model. In addition, it intends to make a contribution to the scholarly literature as it 
combines Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) focusing on actor’s actions and 
International Relations (IR) focusing on system/structure.  
1.3 Organization of the Study 
The study is composed of seven major parts. In Chapter 1, the empirical puzzle 
and the research question together with the theoretical and empirical objectives are 
presented. Chapter 2 is to provide the theoretical framework of the study, which 
starts with a discussion on the study of FPA and continues with literature overview 
on the change in Turkish foreign policy. The model for foreign policy change in 
terms of outcomes follows the literature overview. Subsequently, the theoretical 
guideline is provided, which brings theoretical insights on the security complex 
and foreign policy decision-making separately. Finally in this chapter, the 
theoretical model for foreign policy change is explained, where how the causal 
process occurs is demonstrated. The methodological framework is aptly displaced 
in Chapter 3 which intends to bring explanations concerning the methodological 
choices made in the conduct of this study. Research design, method and material, 
and operationalization of the variables are the contents of this chapter. In Chapter 
4, the change in Turkish foreign policy is demonstrated in a directly comparative 
manner for each type of foreign policy changes, which includes the changes in its 
adjustment, program, and problems and goals. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 are 
fundamentally of the empirical analysis put forth by this study. Chapter 5 seeks to 
search for the source of change by studying the essential structure of the Middle 
Eastern security complex in a before, during, and after approach. Then, Chapter 6 
deals with leadership and decision-making in Turkish foreign policy, in particular 
in the face of the Arab uprisings. It basically focuses on the identification of the 
foreign policy problem and decision-making dynamics, including decision unit, its 
dynamics, and foreign policy vision. Lastly, Chapter 7 aims to provide a summary 
of the findings, some possible generalizations, concluding points and 
recommendations for subsequent studies. 
4 
 
2 Theoretical Framework 
This chapter seeks to provide the theoretical foundation of the study. It starts with 
explanations concerning the study field that it intends to contribute to, and 
discusses the possibilities of combining different theoretical approaches during its 
conduct. Subsequently, overview of existing studies in relation to the Turkish 
foreign policy is carried out in order to figure out possible contributions to the 
literature. Thirdly, a model for foreign policy change in terms of outcomes is 
presented in order to be specific, organized, and structured on the dependent 
variable. Then, it is followed by the theoretical guideline, which introduces 
theoretical underpinnings concerning the explanatory factor and intermediate step 
separately. Finally, theoretical model for foreign policy change, which models the 
overall causal process, is specified. 
2.1 Foreign Policy as a Field of Research 
Distinct from IR which concentrates primarily on the structure, FPA, which is an 
eclectic “actor-specific” sub-field of the former, is interested in explaining how 
and why foreign policy decisions come about.
6
 Although foreign policy has 
heretofore been a field of study that attracted attention of scholars studying IR and 
FPA, the rather specific study of foreign policy change remains relatively 
neglected. In these margins, this study starts with an interest on the theoretical 
question of how and why states act in international arena in specific and 
observable manners they bear, and particularly focuses on how and why states 
change their foreign policy. Within this understanding, what factors may be at 
work in driving states to change their foreign policies, what processes and 
dynamics concerning decision-making may be applicable to the making of 
decisions for change are significant questions to be examined. 
By researching abovementioned queries, this study intends to contribute 
primarily to the study of FPA, while utilising IR studies at the same time. It 
researches the Middle Eastern regional security structure in order to discover the 
explanatory factor behind Turkey‟s foreign policy change. For an individual state 
is never the sole actor operating in international and/or regional system and that 
there remains the constant interaction among international actors and structural 
factors, combining FPA and IR is efficient in the substance of this text. This fact 
                                                          
6 Marijke Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis - A Comparative Introduction (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 164. 
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can potentially lead to changes in foreign policy of states. What is more relevant 
for the purpose of this study is that the structure per se within which that particular 
state conducts its foreign policy may bear factors conductive to change. Therefore, 
it is useful to contextualize the system and external structural factors in which that 
particular state operates. 
Although there is no common theory of foreign policy in the literature, 
scholars tend to take factors at different levels of analysis into consideration and 
construct “multi-causal explanations” by adopting IR theories and other 
approaches such as those explaining domestic sources of foreign policy.
7
 As 
Gustavsson points out, it is sequentially important to see that structural conditions 
can be taken into account to the extent that they are perceived and reacted to by the 
decision-makers.
8
 From this perspective, conducting an inclusive FPA study that 
takes insights from both an IR theory for explaining regional structure and a 
“middle-range theory” concerning foreign policy decision-making is considered 
fruitful. 
2.2 Literature Overview  
It is important to build upon the existing studies in order to locate the study of own 
in the literature and to identify possible research contributions.
9
 In general, the 
literature on Turkish foreign policy does not provide a new theory, but contributes 
to theoretical discussions through regional studies.
10
 Within this context, the recent 
literature on the change in the Turkish foreign policy can be broadly categorized 
within three major areas of study: 
 Change in the Turkish foreign policy with the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (JDP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) with a focus 
on the rise of proactive and multi-dimensional foreign policy and its 
instruments, as well as discussion on “Turkey as a regional power”,11 
 Change in the Turkish foreign policy in terms of Turkey‟s 
international orientation in late 2000s; discussions of 
“Europeanization vs. Islamization and/or Middle-Easternization” of 
Turkish foreign policy, and of the “axis shift”,12 and 
                                                          
7
 Baris Kesgin, „Foreign Policy Analysis‟ in John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning (eds.), 21st Century Political Science: A 
Reference Handbook (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2011), 4. 
8
 Jakob Gustavsson, The Politics of Foreign Policy Change. Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC Membership (Lund: 
Lund University Press, 1998), 16. 
9
 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2005), 70. 
10 Nilüfer Karacasulu, „International Relations Studies in Turkey: Theoretical Considerations‟, Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika, 
8/29 (2012), 155. 
11 See Ziya Öniş, „Multiple Faces of the “New” Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique‟, Insight Turkey, 
13/1 (2011), 47-65; Şaban Kardaş, „Turkey: A Regional Power Facing a Changing International System‟, Turkish Studies, 14/4 
(2013a), 637-660; Tarık Oğuzlu and Emre Parlar Dal, „Decoding Turkey‟s Rise: An Introduction‟, Turkish Studies, 14/4 (2013), 
617-636. 
12 See Tarık Oğuzlu, „Turkey and Europeanization of Foreign Policy?‟, Political Science Quarterly, 125/4 (2011), 657-683; 
Meltem Müftüler Baç and Yaprak Gürsoy, „Is There a Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy? An Addendum to the 
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 Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, Turkish foreign policy in 
the aftermath of Arab uprisings, and the “model” discussion.13 
Concerning the rise of proactive and multi-dimensional foreign policy, Öniş 
and Yılmaz writes in their influential article that proactive, multi-dimensional, and 
soft power-based foreign policy of Turkey, which is very much influenced by 
Davutoğlu‟s “Strategic Depth” vision, marks a considerable continuity in foreign 
policy-making during the JDP era.
14
 The discontinuation, according to them, is that 
Turkey, which they call a regional power, shifted from deep Europeanization to 
“loose Europeanization” and what they call “soft Euro-Asianism” that holds 
Europeanization and Euro-Asian elements together.
15
 Similarly, the international 
orientation of Turkey generated great scholarly debate in the late 2000s. In 
particular, Oğuzlu argues that Turkish foreign policy has become Middle-
Easternized due to pragmatic reasons than ideational, and that Turkey‟s relation 
with the West has mainly been motivated by this pragmatism.
16
 On the other hand, 
according to Larrabee, Turkey‟s diplomatic activism and efforts to establish new 
relations in such areas as Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia mainly are 
mainly to “overcome the anomalies of the Cold War” and to adapt to the post-Cold 
War political and security environment, which therefore do not represent an 
Islamization of its foreign policy.
17
 
Among major discussions concerning Turkish foreign policy, I find those 
concentrating on the challenges brought by the Arab uprisings to the Turkish 
foreign policy more relevant to the content of this research. Keyman and Gumuscu 
argues that the Turkish foreign policy under the JDP governments has faced with 
two serious challenges for some decade which were the severe economic crisis in 
2008 and Arab uprising in the early 2011.
18
 According to them, Arab uprisings led 
to the critical implication in relations with the neighbouring states and to the 
transformation in Turkish proactive and “zero problems with neighbours” foreign 
policies in the region.
19
 Similarly, investigating the impact of the Arab uprisings on 
the viability of Turkish foreign policy, Aras argues that Turkish foreign policy has 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Literature on EU Candidates‟, Turkish Studies, 11/3 (2010), 405-427; Ahmet Sözen, „A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign 
Policy: Transition and Challenges‟, Turkish Studies, 11/1 (2010), 103-123; Soner Cagaptay, „Defining Turkish Power: Turkey as 
a Rising Power Embedded in the Western International System‟, Turkish Studies, 14/4 (2013a), 797-798; Sevilay Kahraman, 
„Turkey and the European Union in the Middle East: Reconciling or Competing with Each Other?‟, Turkish Studies, 12/4 (2011), 
699-716. 
13 See Tarık Oğuzlu, „The „Arab Spring‟ and the Rise of the 2.0 Version of Turkey‟s „zero problems with neighbors‟ Policy‟, 
SAM Papers, No.1 (Feb. 2012); Kemal Kirişçi,„Turkey‟s “Demonstrative Effect” and the Transformation of the Middle East‟, 
Insight Turkey, 13/2 (2011), 33-55; Ömer Taşpınar, „The End of the Turkish Model‟, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 56/2 
(2014), 49-64. 
14
 Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yilmaz, „Between Europeanization and Euro‐Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the 
AKP Era‟, Turkish Studies, 10/1 (2009), 7-9. 
15
 Ibid. 20-21. 
16
 Tarık Oğuzlu, „Middle Easternization of Turkey‟s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?‟, Turkish Studies, 
9/1 (2008), 3, 17. 
17
 Stephen F. Larrabee, „Turkey‟s New Geopolitics‟, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 52/2 (2010), 158. 
18
 E. Fuat Keyman and Sebnem Gumuscu (2014), 84. 
19
 Ibid. 86-89. 
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tilted towards a direction based on more liberal principles, which is to reconcile 
with Turkey‟s “realpolitik concerns” for the region.20 
 These researches offer remarkable insights on Turkish foreign policy and 
challenges and their implications brought by the Arab uprisings on it. Yet, the 
research gap exists in the literature as none of the studies concerning the change in 
Turkish foreign policy in early 2010s has been conducted in a systematic and 
theoretical manner covering structural factors and factors relating to foreign policy 
decision-making. More specifically, none of the research has so far studied change 
in Turkish foreign policy “before and after” the Arab uprisings explicitly in a 
comparative manner within a theoretical model existent in the foreign policy 
change scholarship. Even though I particularly consider the article by Altunışık 
and Martin, Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under 
AKP, very useful study combining both theoretical and empirical insights of 
change in Turkish foreign policy, it compares the first (2002-2007) and second 
(2007-2011) JDP governments and roughly ends in the year 2011 with a little 
comment on the then-emerging Arab uprisings.
21
  From this perspective, this study 
aims to make a research contribution by conducting a before-after comparative 
case study on the change in Turkish foreign policy in the context of Middle Eastern 
security complex in 2010s with a significant emphasis on the structural changes 
and factors relating to foreign policy decision-making. 
2.3 Model for Foreign Policy Change in Terms of Outcomes 
First of all, concerning the dependent variable, i.e. foreign policy change, Hermann 
makes a distinction between foreign policy change resulting from regime change 
or state transformation and foreign policy change in a self-correcting manner by 
current decision-makers.
22
 As Hermann does, the present study also deals with 
“self-correcting” foreign policy change rather than the one through regime or 
government change. 
Subsequently, it is also essential to note that types of foreign policy change 
may differ in terms of scope and domain.
23
 In Hermann‟s framework, foreign 
policy change in terms of outcomes can be categorized in a model of four 
graduated types of change, namely adjustment changes, program changes, problem 
and goal changes, and international orientation change.
24
 To describe these types 
of changes shortly, adjustment changes refer to minor and least demanding 
changes; in other words, changes only in “the level of effort and/or in the scope of 
                                                          
20
 Bülent Aras (2014a), 416. 
21
 See Meliha B. Altunışık and Lenore G. Martin, „Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP‟, 
Turkish Studies, 12/4 (2011), 569-587. 
22 Charles F. Hermann, „Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy‟, International Studies 
Quarterly, 34/1 (1990), 5. 
23 Jakob Gustavsson (1998), 22. 
24 Charles F. Hermann (1990), 5. 
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recipient”, or simply in behaviours.25 On the other hand, the remaining three types 
of foreign policy change represent “major foreign policy change”, either alone or 
together.
26
 Program changes are those in methods, means and/or instruments 
through which a problem is addressed and a goal is pursued, as both of them 
remain fixed and unchanged.
27
 Thirdly, problem and goal changes refer to 
“replacement or forfeit of the initial foreign policy problem and/or goal”.28 This 
type of change may still be limited by few foreign policy issues. Lastly, speaking 
for itself, international orientation change is an extreme type of change in entire 
foreign policy of the state in question, switching the actor‟s position in multiple 
foreign policy issues, roles and activities.
29
 
 
  Figure 1 Hermann‟s Model of Foreign Policy Change in Terms of Outcomes30 
2.4 Theoretical Guideline 
As possibility of employing both IR theories and “middle-range theories” in FPA 
studies is mentioned, and the variables and the causal mechanism between them 
are specified, an initial theoretical explanation concerning the independent variable 
and the intermediate step is now needed before moving on with the subsequent 
chapters.
31
 In this theoretical guideline of the study, the Regional Security 
Complex Theory, which is quite explanatory in presenting the structural conditions 
from a regional security perspective, is presented at first. Subsequently, a 
theoretical approach on foreign policy decision-making, largely developed by 
Margaret G. Hermann and others, are provided in order to conceptualize the role of 
leadership and decision-making in leading to foreign policy change. 
                                                          
25 Charles F. Hermann and Robert S. Billings in Charles F. Hermann in Charles F. Hermann (ed.), When Things Go Wrong - 
Foreign Policy Decision Making under Adverse Feedback (New York: Routledge, 2012), 27. 
26 Charles F. Hermann (1990), 5. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Information from Charles F. Hermann (1990), 5. 
31
 See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2005), 181. 
Adjustment Change
• Change in level of effort 
and/or scope of recipients
Program Change
• Change in methods/means/ 
instruments by which 
goal/problem is addressed
Problem and Goal 
Change
• Replacement or forfeit of 
initial problem/goal
International 
Orientation Change
• Redirection of the actor's 
entire orientation towards 
global affairs
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2.4.1 Regional Security Complex Theory 
The Regional Security Complex Theory is a theory particularly very useful in 
explaining foreign policy change in the context of a security region, as it presents 
descriptive concepts for both static and dynamic analysis and provides benchmarks 
for locating significant change within the structure of international security 
relations.
32
 Although it derives much of its explanatory power from neo-realism 
and constructivism, it differs from them given its emphasis on a regional 
component and generation of new insights from a regional perspective.
33
 The 
theory is primarily made up of indications provided by Barry Buzan and others, 
and broadly concentrates on security regions and security interdependence. It 
particularly suggests that the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of its bipolar 
international structure had great implications on the regional politics and regional 
security complexes. As superpower politics came to a close, an attention was 
diverted to regional powers, decades-long ideological confrontation was lifted, and 
new non-state actors as well as non-military issues were brought along.
34
  
Since most of the conflicts and security challenges of the post-Cold War era 
emerge at a regional level, various regions are significant discrete systems to be 
studied on their own circumstances.
35
 Further, in the contemporary global setting, 
political and military threats travel more easily and quickly over short distances, 
i.e. within regional security complexes, and that proximity relates to security and 
insecurity to a greater extent.
36
 The degree of security interdependence is also more 
intense among members of these complexes than those outside the complexes.
37
 In 
these complexes, major security perceptions and concerns of states within the 
system are “so interlinked that national security of these states cannot be 
considered independent of the others”.38 More specifically, Buzan and others 
suggest that the essential structure of a security complex is made of four elements 
as follows:  
1. Boundary, a geographically distinctive and coherent grouping, 
2. Anarchic structure, in which two or more autonomous units exist, 
3. Distribution of power, which derives from polarity, and 
4. Patterns of amity and enmity, which is the social construction of the 
complex indicating the pattern of security interdependence among the 
units.
39
  
                                                          
32
 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security - A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1998), 15. 
33 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers - The Structure of International Security (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 84. 
34
 Ibid. 17-18. 
35 Şaban Kardaş (2013a), 641. 
36
 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998), 11. 
37
 Barry Buzan and OleWæver (2003), 4. 
38
 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998), 12. 
39 Ibid. 15.; Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003), 53. 
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In this connection, security complexes have an ontological status within 
theory and cannot simply be used to describe any state groupings.
40
 The use of the 
term Middle Eastern security complex is therefore a deliberate theoretical choice 
that fits the classification of Buzan and Wæver, the authors of the renowned book 
called Regions and Powers.
41
 Accordingly, the Middle East represents a 
geographically defined territory in which its members are subject to security 
interdependence within the scope of the abovementioned elements. Besides, the 
they argue that conflictual traits within the Middle East region make it a great 
instance of “classical, state-centric, military-political type” of a regional security 
complex.
42
  
Once the essential structure of a security complex is identified, it can also be 
used to narrow down possible options for change by providing stepping stones for 
the location of significant changes in the structure.
43
 In other words, the elements 
of the essential structure of a security complex are not only useful variables in 
describing the characteristics of the complex, but also useful indicators in 
identifying and assessing structural changes at a regional level. To be clear, 
changes in any of the elements lead to evolution of a security complex. In their 
influential book called Security - A New Framework for Analysis, Buzan and 
others define four options for change in a regional security structure, namely 
maintenance of the status quo, internal transformation, external transformation, and 
overlay.
44
  
To begin with, maintenance of the status quo indicates that the essential 
structure of a complex and its elements remain intact, where changes can still take 
place in a minor and unchallenging manner.
45
 At the second place, internal 
transformation simply refers to essential structural changes within the context of 
its existing outer boundaries through either in its anarchic structure, decisive shifts 
in polarity and distribution of power, or major alternations in patterns of amity and 
enmity.
46
 In other words, there is more than one possibility for internal 
transformation, be it by changes in anarchic structure, distribution of power or 
patterns of amity and enmity.
47
 Thirdly, external transformation demonstrates 
either expansion or contraction of its existing outer boundary, thus to change 
membership in the complex.
48
 Lastly, overlay revolves around an event where one 
or more external powers penetrate into the complex, and hence, suppressing and 
changing the particular security dynamics of the structure.
49
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2.4.2 Foreign Policy Decision-Making Approach 
Foreign policy problems, i.e. sources of foreign policy change, are subjective and 
depend on perceptions of political leaders and policymakers.
50
 Although various 
domestic and/or international factors influence foreign policy decisions, these must 
be processed through a decision-making structure of a government or a decision 
unit which identifies, decides and implements foreign policy decisions.
51
 Since the 
Regional Security Complex Theory primarily intends to explain regional structural 
conditions and does not adequately focus on decision-making and factors that 
belong to decision-making, a separate, middle-range theoretical approach on 
foreign policy decision-making is necessary to better contextualize factors, 
processes, and dynamics relating to the mentioned content.
52
 A variety of 
approaches are existent in scholarly literature focusing on different aspects of 
foreign policy decision-making such as domestic politics, bureaucratic decision-
making, cybernetics, and learning approaches.
53
 Yet, the focus in the content of 
this study is more on the successive steps of decision-making process and 
dynamics within. 
The models of foreign policy decision-making are helpful in explaining the 
process regardless of the evaluative assessment of the procedures and results they 
lead to.
54
 In particular for the focus in this study, a model comprised of two core 
elements of the process is used, which is a practical choice in order not to 
investigate the whole decision-making process with particular interest from 
different approaches. In the decision-making model that is applied here, there are 
two primary steps to explore how the decision-making process functions as an 
intermediate step between the source of change and foreign policy change: First, 
identification of problem, and second, decision unit dynamics. 
Identification of foreign policy problem 
Structural conditions, as Gustavsson offers, do not have independent impact on 
foreign policy decision-making; but they are perceived and reacted by the foreign 
policy-makers.
55
 Most foreign policy change comes after a perception by the 
foreign policy leadership of some change or initiative in the external environment, 
which are large events in terms of visibility and its immediate impact on the 
recipient.
56
 Although foreign policy-makers have initial goals and agendas, their 
foreign policy can change upon an encounter with problems and challenges in 
international environment.
57
 Within this context, decision-making concerning 
change in foreign policy takes place as soon as policy-makers recognize a foreign 
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policy problem. Therefore, a researcher needs to start with a problem in 
investigating how foreign policy decisions are made.
58
 The identification of 
foreign policy problem requires various intelligence collections and analyses by 
foreign policy-makers.
59
 According to Hermann, a foreign policy problem is 
recognized when foreign policy-makers declare that “something is wrong, needs 
attention, or presents an opportunity for gain if action is taken”.60 Therefore, 
discourse by the members of the foreign policy decision unit on a current or 
potential difficulty is instrumental in researching the recognition of problem.
61
 Last 
but not least, foreign policy problems emerge episodically, and often necessitate a 
series of decisions rather than a single decision, which force policy-makers to get 
involved in a string of occasions for decisions.
62
 
Decision unit and its dynamics 
When foreign policy decision-makers recognize a foreign policy problem, decision 
unit dynamics bear great significance since configuration and dynamics can affect 
foreign policy outcome.
63
 In other words, since what happens in decision unit 
dynamics can lead to different foreign policy outcomes, the need to move beyond 
outcomes of the decision and to investigate decision unit dynamics is evident.
64
 
For this objective, subsequently after recognition of foreign policy problem by 
foreign policy-makers, the questions who makes decisions concerning a problem, 
what factors might be influential behind decisions, and what dynamics exist in 
foreign policy decision unit carry significance to be considered.  
Decision unit is the authoritative body that has the ability to commit resources 
of a government to foreign affairs, and to prevent other individuals, groups, or 
entities from overtly reversing their decisions.
65
 In fact, it is the decision unit that 
perceives and interprets pressures and constraints, and makes foreign policy 
decisions.
66
 Therefore, configuration of a decision unit and the dynamics within 
affect a foreign policy action chosen.
67
 Concerning the configuration of decision 
unit, Hermann and Hermann offer three different types of authoritative units as 
following:  
1. Predominant leader who is a single individual with the ability to make 
foreign policy decisions by his own, 
2. Single group consisting of a set of individuals as members of a single unit 
making foreign policy decisions in an interactive and collective manner, and 
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3. Coalition of autonomous group which is formed by separate individuals, 
groups or representatives that can act for a government but cannot decide by their 
own or force compliance on others.
68
 
For practical reasons, there is a need for identifying which decision unit and 
which decision unit dynamics might be applicable to the case at hand beforehand. 
This is basically because each type of decision unit and each type of dynamics 
within decision unit can be better explained by different theoretical approaches and 
insights. Concerning decision unit, in order to decide what unit is in charge at the 
given instance, it is necessary to take two significant issues into consideration. 
Firstly, decision unit may change in accordance with the nature of a problem. To 
illustrate, it may be at a lower level in the government for more routine problems, 
while the highest political authorities are likely to be part of the decision unit for 
foreign policy issues of utmost importance.
69
 In the given content of this study, the 
choice for a decision unit is the latter. Secondly, Hermann points out some 
practical boundary issues in determining authoritative decision unit. The option of 
coalition of autonomous group is excluded since the Turkish government has been 
a single-party government. Thus, the focus is on the question of whether the 
decision unit is an example of a predominant leader or single group. According to 
Hermann, if a leader has the ability to make decisions as he or she prefers, the unit 
is a predominant leader model.
70
 On the other hand, she argues that if a leader sees 
individuals as members of decision-making, the unit becomes a single group model 
based on interactive and collective decision-making.
71
 Considering such boundary 
and non-uniformity considerations, the study is developed with single group 
model. This choice will be empirically elaborated further in the relevant chapter.  
A single group decision unit, a frequent model in contemporary governments, 
is composed of two or more people interacting directly with each other and 
collectively making a foreign policy decision.
72
 A single group decision unit is not 
necessarily a legal and formal authoritative unit; instead, it has to have a de facto 
ability to make foreign policy decisions without another unit‟s approval or reversal 
of its decisions.
73
 As the definition tells, there may be several members and group 
of individuals in a single group, most commonly such as foreign and/or defence 
ministers, bureaucrats, advisors, who are primary loyal to the group. On the other 
hand, weight of the group members in influencing foreign policy decisions can 
vary.
74
 In other words, power to influence decisions is unequally distributed among 
group members.
75
 Although prime ministers as heads of the executive tend to be 
more influential in the foreign policy decisions, power to influence decisions can 
change depending on various factors. For instance, the leaders who have no prior 
policy expertise in policy area are highly subject to the need for information when 
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taking decisions.
76
 In this case, they are more likely to leave some members of a 
decision unit a major room for the formulation of foreign policy decisions. 
Eventually, the weight of these actors to influence decision-making can be 
expected to be higher than the rest of the group members. 
As regards the importance of strategic beliefs and objectives in influencing 
decision-making for foreign policy change, Hermann and others argue that the 
nature of the foreign policy decisions is likely to be based on the general 
preferences of its members concerning the problem at hand.
77
 For them, this can be 
examined by determining if the members share set of beliefs that are triggered by 
the problem, or by seeking knowledge on the orientations of any strong leaders in 
the group.
78
 In other words, knowledge on individual members‟ preferences such 
as shared beliefs are explanatory; yet, when there is not enough information on it, 
the direction of the group decision can be considered by looking for other data 
such as the orientation of the influential member in the unit.
79
 Besides, Boulding 
asserts that it is the set of beliefs, and biases, which can simply be defined as an 
“image” held by the foreign policy leadership which plays the most important role 
in forming foreign policy decisions.
80
 
Beyond formation of a decision unit, decision unit dynamics are crucial in 
determining the nature of process.
81
 Among three models existing in the literature 
to explain how to cope with conflict within the unit, i.e. “groupthink, bureaucratic 
politics, and winning majority”, this study adopts groupthink model. In groupthink 
model, loyalty of members is to the unit; thus, they try to minimize a possible 
conflict by seeking concurrence.
82
 Concurrence often becomes process outcome in 
groupthink model of single groups since shared preferences and sense of 
movement is evident among its members.
83
 Besides, if information received by 
members is from a common source and if there is a little conflict in general over 
foreign policy vision and issues, prompt consensus is even more likely.
84
 Decisions 
made through concurrence tend to be most extreme in content-wise since decision-
making process becomes more on what to do rather than mediating 
disagreements.
85
 However, the fact that members perceive the world in a similar 
way, and that there is a strong cohesion among them concerning policy choices and 
alternatives, they may lack proposing alternative points of views and ways to 
confront a problem.
86
 In other words, motivation of group members to maintain 
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group consensus and feeling of loyalty may potentially lead to deterioration of 
decision-making quality.
87
 
2.5 Theoretical Model for Foreign Policy Change 
Causal mechanisms are “unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes 
through which agents with causal capacities operate” in limited and specific 
frameworks.
88
 In constructing the causal model, the “checklist models”, which are 
based on three analytical steps, are quite enlightening. According to Gustavsson, 
the three step of the checklist models are first the identification of some potentially 
important background factors; second, the intermediate step of cognitive factors 
and factors belonging to the decision-making; third, the connection of these to the 
outcome in a typology for different types of foreign policy change.
89
 
The three-step procedure held in this study is also similar to Gustavsson‟s 
alternative model where he identifies “a number of „sources‟ that are mediated by 
„individual decision-makers‟ who act within the „decision-making process‟ in 
order to bring about a change in policy”.
90
 Similarly in my case, foreign policy 
change takes place following the causal process where the source of change, that is 
the foreign policy problem, is perceived and mediated by the foreign policy 
decision unit in a decision-making process. Although Gustavsson offers three 
particular conditions that facilitate foreign policy change in his model, viz. changes 
in fundamental structural conditions, strategic political leadership, and presence of 
a crisis of some kind, this study excludes last condition, and investigates the 
change in regional structural conditions and foreign policy leadership and decision-
making.
91
 
A difference between two studies may be noted in strategic leadership and 
decision-making process. In Gustavsson‟s case, the Swedish government is a new 
coalition government and decision-making is an outcome of politics between 
divergent political parties or figures within the cabinet. In my case, on the other 
hand, the Turkish government is a single-party government that is in office for 
more than a decade, and foreign policy decision-making is carried out by a single 
group decision unit led by the same political leadership. Therefore, this theoretical 
choice largely derives from an empirical reason which is the difference between 
types of governments and foreign policy decision units. 
Concerning the selection of independent variables, i.e. the sources of change, 
Gustavsson offers again a good framework in his dissertation Politics of Foreign 
Policy Change. Gustavsson‟s twofold explanatory factors, which are international 
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and domestic sources of change, and their political and economic sub-explanatory 
factors are quite inclusive, well-structured, and easy to grasp in explaining the 
causes of foreign policy change from a broad perspective.
92
 This is particularly a 
good choice for comprehensive research projects that seek multiple explanations at 
different levels behind an outcome. Yet, in order to conduct an even more focused 
research and seek the causal relationship between a single explanatory variable and 
a dependent variable, this study explores the change in regional security structure 
as the single source of change. 
 
  Figure 2 Theoretical Model for Change in Turkish Foreign Policy 
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Independent Variable: 
Source of Change
• Regional security factors - Change 
in the regional security structure
Intermediate Step: 
Leadership and Decision-
Making
• Identification of foreign policy 
problem
• Decision unit and decision-making 
dynamics
Dependent Variable: Foreign 
Policy Change
• Adjustment changes
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3 Methodological Framework 
This chapter aims to provide explanations concerning the methodological choices 
made in this study. To sum up in a few words, the research design employed is a 
single case study. Besides, it represents an instance of before-after comparison as a 
longitudinal case is divided into two as before and after a phenomenon. The 
method is qualitative analysis, which is enriched by the methods of discourse 
analysis as well as process-tracing. Lastly, the material includes both primary and 
secondary sources. 
3.1 Research Design 
This study is a single case study which focuses on the explanation of the change in 
Turkish foreign policy. Case studies are convenient for IR and FPA studies since 
they can provide intensive empirical analysis by enabling the researcher to identify 
plausible causal variables in a given phenomenon.
93
 This case study is carried out 
at the within-case level of analysis which is eminently concerned with causal 
mechanisms and processes. Researching the causal mechanism between the change 
in regional security structure as the source of change and the change in Turkish 
foreign policy as the foreign policy change, this study adopts within-case level of 
analysis that enables to investigate in-depth the process within which the 
explanatory and intermediate factors produce the outcome.
94
 In addition, it intends 
to provide a contextual description of the political phenomenon, namely foreign 
policy change, which is best served by single-case studies.
95
 
Although this study carries theoretical aims such as to contribute to the study 
of foreign policy change by providing an alternative model for foreign policy 
change and by combining FPA and IR studies, it is basically a case-centered case 
study rather than a theory-centered one. This notion implies that the use of theory 
is instrumental to provide a comprehensive explanation of the single case where 
the insights derived from the case are not used for the development of a general 
theory.
96
 One possible disadvantage of this choice, as Rohlfing points out, is the 
non-generalization of the explanation for the single case to other cases in case-
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centered studies.
97
 Although there is still, but limited, possibility to generalize the 
findings, case-centered case studies are clearly more convenient for generating 
policy-relevant knowledge rather than generalizing findings to other cases. In this 
regard, this study also intends to produce policy-relevant knowledge concerning 
the change in Turkish foreign policy in the given contents and limitations. 
The way it is is a comparative study is its before-after comparison within a 
single case. Before-after comparison allows the researcher to achieve control by 
dividing a single longitudinal case into two sub-cases with the occurrence of a 
phenomenon functioning as an experimental intervention.
98
 George and Bennett 
note that controlled comparison can be achieved by dividing a longitudinal case 
into “before” and “after” a discontinuous change in an important variable.99 To be 
clear, the single longitudinal case, i.e. Turkish foreign policy, is divided as 
“before” and “after” the Arab uprisings. From this perspective, the Arab uprisings 
are taken as operating as the watershed for the Turkish foreign policy. 
The need to determine time-wise limitations is fundamental for both 
methodological and theoretical reasons. The “before” period refers to the time span 
between 2007 and 2011. Its start marks the point when the ruling JDP government 
evidently consolidated its political power by coming to its second-term in power 
and started to enjoy comprehensive foreign policy dynamism, most notably in the 
context of Middle Eastern affairs. It lasts until the outbreak of the Arab uprisings. 
On the other hand, the “after” period refers to that between 2011 and 2014. It is 
between the outbreak of the Arab uprisings and the time when the making up of 
study is mapped. As the “after” period also represents the third term of the ruling 
JDP government, there remains continuity in the political governance in Turkey. 
Since case studies require a substantial level of observation, three to four-year 
period of observations are allocated for both before and after periods. In 
conclusion, by defining before and after periods as between 2007 and 2011 and 
between 2011 and 2014 respectively, the study is distinctively delimited with a 
time-wise perspective and directed in a more focused way. 
3.2 Research Method and Material 
As this study is motivated primarily by the questions of why and how, qualitative 
method of analysis is quite relevant in the conduct of the research of the 
phenomenon. Qualitative analysis is a discursive research method which generally 
focuses on one or a small number of cases in which a particular event, decision, 
institution, issue or a major change is investigated.
100
 By combining qualitative 
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techniques and a case study, this study aims to have a better understanding of the 
context in which the phenomenon takes place. 
On the other hand, within-case methods are also instrumental in constructing 
explanations in single case studies. Particularly for the purpose of in-depth 
research of the Arab uprisings and figuring out possible changes in the regional 
security structure, process-tracing is also used in examining the development of 
the Arab uprisings. In single-case studies which leaves more room for the 
researchers to study the case more intensively, process-tracing is a useful within-
case method to explore the variables and any other possible variables. Another 
clear advantage of the use of process-tracing in a single case study is its ability to 
generate numerous observations within a case and to link them in particular ways 
to make an explanation of the case.
101
 In this regard, this study takes benefit of 
process-tracing method particularly in order to explore the development of the 
Arab uprisings, which helps to identify any particular changes in the regional 
security structure, which subsequently might become a foreign policy problem and 
lead to a foreign policy change.  
With respect to the data collection and the material, both primary and 
secondary sources are benefited. At this point, discourse analysis is an important 
method used in this study particularly in the intermediate step of foreign policy 
leadership and decision-making, given its instrumentality in reflecting the 
behavioural and cognitive factors. It is also quite helpful in indicating the change 
in Turkish foreign policy since foreign policy can most of the time be observed 
from the discourse derived from declarations, writings, and speeches of the 
responsible people. It is therefore directed towards the key foreign policy decision-
makers since they are, as human beings, those capable of seeing, perceiving, 
thinking, and making choices.
102
 In this regard, an array of secondary and primary 
sources and material such as earlier books, articles, and speeches by the foreign 
policy leadership as well as official press releases and documents by the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) are used. 
For the purpose of generating empirical evidences, newspaper sources and 
magazine articles are also valuable primary and secondary sources respectively. 
While using sources as such, the widespread and trustworthy international and 
national news agencies, newspapers, and magazines are utilized in order to sustain 
the objectivity and general acceptability. In addition to these, scholarly literature as 
a secondary source is often used as an informative tool throughout the study. These 
sources include literature not only on the Turkish foreign policy and its leadership 
and decision-making, but also on the Middle Eastern security structure. Although 
this is a qualitative case study, the use of statistical data is not irrelevant in the 
contextualizing the indicators at all.
103
 The reports and the information derived 
from think-tanks, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and government 
bodies are seen as useful primary sources particularly for the purpose of acquiring 
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statistical data on the indicators, notably in the chapters for the change in Turkish 
foreign policy and the source of change. 
3.3 Operationalization of the Variables 
The variables of the study are basically operationalized through the investigation 
of the following empirical questions: 
 What has been changed? (What is the “change” in terms of dependent 
variable?) 
 What were the adjustment, program, and problem and goal before? 
 What are the adjustment, program, and problem and goal after? (for 
operationalization of the dependent variable) 
 What explains this change? Why did foreign policy change occur? 
(for operationalization of the independent variable) 
 What is the role of foreign policy leadership and decision-making? 
(for operationalization of the intermediate step) 
How to narrow down the components of the study, and for what to look 
exactly in order to have an objective and analytical examination of the variables 
necessitate defining and showing the indicators and measurement. To begin with, it 
is useful to provide description of the concepts of foreign policy and foreign policy 
change. Hermann simply describes foreign policy as “a program designed to 
address some problem or pursue some goal that entails action toward foreign 
entities”.
104
 To be more specific on the definition, Cohen and Harris describes 
foreign policy as “a set of goals, directives or intentions, formulated by persons in 
official or authoritative positions, directed at some actor or condition in the 
environment beyond the sovereign nation state, for the purpose of affecting the 
target in the manner desired by the policy-makers”.
105
 Foreign policy change, on 
the other hand, is basically defined as “either a new act in a given situation or a 
given act in a situation previously associated with a different act”.
106
 Yet, these 
definitions still need further explanation for what to look while investigating the 
source of change, leadership and decision-making, and foreign policy change. 
First of all, in order to operationalize the change in Turkish foreign policy as 
the outcome, the model presented in the abovementioned theoretical framework is 
very helpful. The change in Turkish foreign policy is operationalized in terms of 
adjustment, program, and problem and goal. To be more specific, while observing 
the adjustment changes, change in the level of efforts and in class of targets is 
explained, which is largely through an observation of the new actors becoming the 
recipients of the Turkish foreign policy and examination of any increase or 
decrease in commitment in Middle Eastern security affairs. Then, program change 
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is operationalized by the observation of any change in methods and instruments of 
foreign policy. For this, any change in the use of coercive measures such as 
military intervention, military precautions, or economic sanctions is researched. 
Last but not least, any shift of emphasis on foreign policy problems and foreign 
policy objectives are researched for the operationalization of problem and goal 
change. 
Secondly, in an attempt to be more specific in a more focused content, this 
study intends to investigate regional security structure as the only source of 
change, i.e. the explanatory variable, and explore the co-variance between a single 
source of change and the foreign policy change. To be clear, the regional security 
structure before and after the Arab uprisings, and the change between the two 
periods are implemented through the elements of the essential structure of the 
security complex, namely boundary, anarchic structure, distribution of power, and 
patterns of amity and enmity. At this point, the change in regional security 
structure takes form of internal transformation of the Middle Eastern security 
complex. The Arab uprisings operate as a watershed, leading to internal 
transformation of the regional security structure by altering the patterns of amity 
and enmity. In other words, the regional security structure change brought by the 
Arab uprisings in early 2010s is explained as internal transformation of the 
security complex in which the patterns of amity and enmity have been altered. 
Even more precisely, changes in the patterns of amity and enmity are 
operationalized through regime and government changes, rise of non-state actors, 
growing politicization of religious identities, emerging new security threats, and 
ongoing uncertainty and instability in the face of the uprisings. 
Concerning the leadership and decision-making, this study focuses on how 
foreign policy-makers perceive the problem, who is responsible for making 
decisions on foreign policy changes, and what factors drive the decision-making 
dynamics. From this perspective, the chapter on foreign policy and leadership aims 
to research the identification of the foreign policy problem by the foreign policy-
makers, the composition of the decision unit, the strategic beliefs, objectives, and 
foreign policy vision vis-à-vis the regional political and security affairs, and the 
factors influential in the decision-making dynamics respectively. While cognitive 
factors and perceived challenges play the decisive role in identification of a foreign 
policy problem, the weight to influence decisions is the predominant factor in 
exploring the composition of the decision unit. Subsequently, strategic beliefs and 
objectives are investigated as the operationalized leading factors in relation to a 
foreign policy vision. Lastly, the aspects of groupthink and concurrence are 
researched as regards the decision-making dynamics. 
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4 Change in Turkish Foreign Policy 
This chapter aims to explain the dependent variable, i.e. the change in Turkish 
foreign policy in the context of the Middle Eastern security complex in the early 
2010s. When the source of change, that is internal transformation of the Middle 
Eastern security complex, is interpreted and mediated by the foreign policy 
decision unit in a foreign policy decision-making process, the outcome is a change 
in Turkish foreign policy in the context of its regional affairs. Since this study first 
and foremost starts with the argument that there is a change in Turkish foreign 
policy, it is of utmost importance to mention the types of changes occurred. In line 
with the Hermann‟s model for foreign policy change in terms of outcomes, the 
change is defined under three categories: Adjustment changes, program changes, 
and problem and goal changes. In this regard, the present study argues that there 
has been no change in Turkey‟s international orientation; thus, excludes it from the 
content. That there have occurred two of three types of major foreign policy 
changes, it can be put forth that a major foreign policy change has occurred in 
Turkey‟s course, according to Hermann‟s typology. This section follows a before-
after comparison in each part separately in order to have a better comparative 
insight concerning the change. 
4.1 Adjustment Changes 
In brief, when Turkish foreign policy-makers faced with the Arab uprisings, they 
made two main adjustment changes in the context of the Middle East security 
complex: First, increase in efforts concerning the Middle Eastern security issues, 
and second, shift in the main recipients of Turkish foreign policy. 
4.1.1 Increase in Efforts in Regional Security Affairs 
First of all, it is clear to acknowledge that particularly since the second half of the 
2000s, Turkish foreign policy has shifted towards greater engagement with Middle 
Eastern affairs by seeking regional security through dialogue as a means of solving 
crises, conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance.
107
 In fact, this was an 
extension of “zero problems with neighbours” policy that endangered Turkish 
involvement in regional issues.
108
 In late 2000s, “zero problems with neighbours” 
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policy became increasingly evident largely by its extensive efforts for facilitation, 
mediation, resolution of conflicts, and pre-emptive diplomacy in the regional 
security challenges and conflicts such as in Iran‟s nuclear program, political crisis 
in Lebanon, between Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq, between Al-Fatah and Hamas in 
Palestine, between Syria and Israel, between Hamas and Israel.
109
 Thus, Turkey 
appeared as a proactive, mediator state in facilitating direct or indirect talks in 
settling the conflicts and tensions between actors. Although Turkey‟s diplomatic 
visibility noticeably increased during the period before 2011 through mediation 
and facilitation efforts, the use of humanitarian and development aid as a means of 
soft power remained modest. During the period before the uprisings, Turkey 
primarily aimed to provide aid to the regional countries in crisis, such as Palestine, 
Iraq, and Lebanon; yet, the use of foreign aid as a foreign policy instrument was 
limited.
110
 
Since the outbreak of the uprisings, there has been a dramatic increase in both 
diplomatic efforts and foreign aid. Firstly, in terms of the diplomatic efforts, 
Turkey particularly became vocal in Syria, Egypt, and Libya in the management of 
prospective transition. Given the failure of mediation and peaceful resolution of 
conflicts since the early stages of the uprisings, Turkey‟s diplomatic efforts during 
the uprisings and in its aftermath have taken a new form by its active use of 
diplomacy in pushing the international community. In this sense, the use of 
diplomatic means continues to embody one of the top elements of Turkish foreign 
policy since Turkey has been a leading member of several peace and mediation 
initiatives for the resolution of the regional conflicts and security challenges. 
However, given the inefficiency of diplomacy in bringing peace and solution 
during the uprisings, the efforts have gradually been shifted from mediation to the 
management of transition. This was evident in the case of Syria, where Turkey 
initially engaged in extensive efforts to persuade Assad, the President of Syria, to 
introduce reforms as early as the uprisings started.
111
 Since these efforts became 
fruitless, Turkey ceased its relations with the regime, started to exert “all 
constructive efforts to speed up the peace process” by taking part in several 
international initiatives in an effort to provide peaceful resolution of the conflict.
112
 
Consistently, Turkey has also participated in all efforts by the international 
community in resolution of conflicts in several other countries, and sought to 
develop both its bilateral and multilateral relations in order to encourage 
democratic transition throughout the region. 
Secondly, the increase in efforts is also evident in terms of Turkey‟s efforts in 
providing official development assistance and humanitarian aid. Turkey‟s foreign 
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aid in the face of the Arab uprisings continues to be motivated by security 
considerations and crises as it used to be before them. Nonetheless, there has been 
a dramatic increase in the amount provided.
113
 Since the beginning of the 
phenomenon, Turkey has tripled its official development assistance, reaching 3.3 
billion US Dollars in 2013, more than 1.7 billion of which was allocated in the 
Middle East, making the region the top destination of the Turkish aid.
114
 The 
development assistance provided by Turkey during the period has largely been in 
the form of state-building assistance and economic development such as 
infrastructural improvement and provision of basic services; most notably in 
Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.
115
 In particular concerning the humanitarian aid, Turkey 
became the third most generous country and fourth largest donor in 2012, and “the 
most generous country” and third largest donor worldwide in 2013 by providing 
0.13% and 0.21% of its gross national income respectively as humanitarian aid.
116
 
In the aftermath of the uprisings, the crisis in Syria has elaborated a crystal clear 
instance of the dramatic increase of Turkish humanitarian aid. Turkey introduced 
an “open-door policy” to the Syrian people fleeing from the civil war in Syria, 
received more than 1.7 million Syrian citizen by providing them with a “temporary 
protection status”, and spent 5.6 billion United States (US) Dollars in total for 
humanitarian needs of the Syrian people living in Turkey.
117
  
 
  Figure 3 Official Development Assistance by Turkey between 2007 and 2013118 
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  Figure 4 Humanitarian Aid by Turkey between 2007 and 2013119 
4.1.2 Shift in Recipients of Turkish Foreign Policy 
The second adjustment occurs in the form of shift in recipients of Turkish foreign 
policy. It is true that as early as the proactive and multi-dimensional foreign policy 
was implemented, Turkey recognized the necessity to have comprehensive 
communication channels that would include all relevant actors, both state and non-
state, in the resolution of conflicts in the Middle Eastern security environment. 
Such foreign policy understanding can be seen, as mentioned above, in its 
mediation efforts between Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis, and between Hamas and Israel 
as well as others before the Arab uprisings. Still, the main recipient of the Turkish 
foreign policy during the period before the Arab uprisings remained the regimes 
and governments within the context of the “zero problems with neighbours” 
policy. 
Following the Arab uprisings, there has been a shift in the main recipients of 
Turkish foreign policy from regimes to opposition groups. When the authoritarian 
regimes and governments in the region tried to suppress their own people and their 
demand for democracy by the use of violence, Turkey, according to Davutoğlu, 
had no choice other than to side with the opposition‟s “struggles for honour and 
dignity”.120 Thus, Turkey cut down its relations with the regimes, and sought to 
develop its relations with the opposition and other non-state groups. This was 
evident in the cases in which Turkey actively involved, such as in Syria, Egypt, 
and Libya. In Syria, Turkey has been one of the leading countries backing the 
Syrian opposition by hosting its several meetings and lobbying in the international 
community, for example through organizing the second summit of the Friends of 
the Syrian People in 2012.
121
 Similarly in Libya, Davutoğlu went to Benghazi and 
met leadership of the opposition National Transition Council (NTC) during the 
uprisings, and stated that “Qaddafi must go. We recognize the NTC as the 
legitimate representative of Libyan people”.122 Following the overthrow of the 
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authoritarian regimes, Erdoğan, together with several ministers, top officials and 
businesspeople, visited Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya and sought to develop political 
and economic relations with the new governments.
123
 In this respect, the main 
recipients of Turkish foreign policy have shifted from regimes to opposition 
groups and new governments. 
4.2 Program Changes 
Following the minor adjustment changes, the first pillar of Turkey‟s major foreign 
policy change is that in its program. Shortly, program change in Turkish foreign 
policy in the context of the Middle East security complex takes place through a 
shift from the use of soft power instruments alone to the use of soft power and 
coercive foreign policy instruments together.
124
 
4.2.1 Introduction of Coercive Foreign Policy Instruments 
During the period between 2007 and the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, the 
instruments of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle Eastern regional affairs were 
widely those of soft power as hard measures were refrained from as an instrument 
to tackle problems and to pursue foreign policy objectives. Consistently, the JDP 
government sought to mobilize soft power instruments including economic 
integration, mediation and conflict resolution, development assistance, and cultural 
dialogue.
125
 In addition, such policies further included peaceful resolution of 
bilateral disputes, removal of visa requirements, establishment of free trade zones, 
and establishment of strategic cooperation councils with countries in its 
neighbourhood.
126
 From this perspective, Turkish foreign policy program before 
the Arab uprisings was of proactive and multi-dimensional foreign policy 
principally based on the use of soft power in its conduct of diplomacy. 
However, the changing regional structure has put a serious challenge to 
Turkish foreign policy for the continuation of this practice. In addition to the 
continuing emphasis on soft power means to deal with regional developments, the 
policy-makers have also gradually incorporated coercive foreign policy 
instruments into options available.
127
 An important example of this was when 
Turkey took an active stance in the case of Libya back in 2011. Even though the 
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foreign policy leadership repeatedly opposed any foreign military intervention in 
the region as a principle, Turkey eventually took part in the international military 
intervention therein.
128
 Some scholars more particularly argue that Turkish foreign 
policy-makers were quite reluctant in the beginning for an international military 
intervention in Libya given its economic and human security-interests where 
Turkey had 25,000 citizens and high amount of investments.
129
 However, when the 
mediation efforts became fruitless and a foreign military intervention was seen 
imminent by Turkish policy-makers, they changed their policy and insisted on the 
command to be handed over to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
130
 
Secondly, the change in Turkey‟s “non-military engagement” policy can be 
observed in the example of Syria in terms of introduction of coercive measures.
131
 
First type of coercive measures included economic sanctions, freezing of assets, 
and travel ban, harming the Syrian economy and isolating the Assad regime with 
coercive measures.
132
 On the other hand, the emergence of threats to its own 
security, particularly from its Syrian border, led Turkish foreign policy-makers to 
consider developing its military measures and capabilities in addition to other 
coercive measures. The downing of a Turkish jet by the Syrian regime in 2012, 
frequent instances of border violations and mortar shelling, and Reyhanli 
bombings in 2013 were clear examples of such security challenges.
133
 Hence, the 
JDP government increased its military expenditure since 2011, given its 13% 
increase in 2012 and 12% increase in 2013. Besides, in order to improve Turkey‟s 
air defence capabilities to defend its population and territory in November 2012, 
the government requested the deployment of Patriot missiles from NATO, which 
was eventually agreed by the North Atlantic Council in December 2012.
134
 In 
brief, in addition to its emphasis on soft power instruments, coercive measures 
including economic sanctions and military measures were adopted in the face of 
regional developments and security challenges. 
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  Figure 5 Military Expenditure by Turkey between 2007 and 2013135 
4.3 Problem and Goal Changes 
The major change in Turkish foreign policy has been further compounded by that 
in problems defined and goals set. This section specifically presents anew an 
evaluation on those with the before and after the Arab uprisings tool. 
4.3.1 Problem Changes 
The regional problems before the Arab uprisings were long-lasting ideological 
rivalries and enduring conflicts in the region, institutionalized by authoritarian 
regimes and governments.
136
 The problematization of such regional issues was the 
same for Turkish foreign policy as well, considering that they constituted major 
obstacles to the objective of promoting regional cooperation and integration. The 
problematization of ideological rivalries and “chronic” conflicts in the region by 
Turkish foreign policy-makers can be derived from the MFA‟s main issues and 
priorities, as reflected in its extensive efforts for mediation and facilitation. 
Further, continuing problems of Turkey with its Middle Eastern neighbours were 
perceived as one of the top foreign policy problems, and were to be addressed 
through the prominent “zero problems with neighbours” policy and its relevant 
“proactive and pre-emptive diplomacy”. 
Following the Arab uprisings, not only rivalries and conflicts have persisted 
in the region, but also concerns on two issues, namely human security and national 
security, have become apparent by Turkish foreign policy-makers. Firstly, efforts 
of authoritarian regimes to preserve and sustain their rule through brutal force 
simply led to intensification of violent clashes, and thus caused growing 
humanitarian suffering in Turkey‟s neighbourhood. Death toll quickly reached to 
ten thousands, while hundreds of thousands had to flee their countries in several 
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countries. For Turkish foreign policy-makers, this was perceived as a humanitarian 
disaster next door particularly in the case of Syria, in addition to a development 
deteriorating its border management. Secondly, changes brought by the Arab 
uprisings have disturbed the balance of power compared to status quo ante, 
particularly in terms of territorial integrity and national security. Given the 
abovementioned security threats and incidents such as border violations, downing 
of jets, and bombings, national security has become a serious topic to prioritize for 
the policy-makers, most notably in its 900 km-long Syrian border where 
intensifying violent struggle and instability had direct consequences for Turkey.
137
 
Besides, the seizure of the Turkish Mosul consulate and the kidnapping of the 
Turkish consul together with 49 Turkish citizens, and growing security threats to 
the Tomb of Suleyman Shah, which is the property of Turkey in Syria, by the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) militants have recently revealed 
increasing security threats to Turkey and its integrity.
138
 In sum, foreign policy 
problems shifted from regional rivalries and conflicts to national and human 
security in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. 
4.3.2 Goal Changes 
During the period before the Arab uprisings, Turkish foreign policy objectives 
were largely in line with the status quo and the regional balance of power. 
According to Aras, Turkey pursued a foreign policy aiming for indirect 
transformation of authoritarian regimes through close bilateral relations; thus, for 
gradual transformation of the regional order.
139
 In any case, Turkish foreign policy 
was therefore not to challenge the status quo. In fact, it was widely identified with 
its “zero problems with neighbours” policy, which was basically formulated to 
eliminate the existing problems inhibiting the cooperation and integration with the 
neighbours and achieve “zero problems” back then. Davutoğlu remarks the 
objectives of Turkish foreign policy in the context of its zero problems policy by 
stating that Turkey needs to reconcile with its environs by sustaining economic, 
cultural and political integration.
140
 “Zero problems with neighbours” policy 
therefore represents an instrumental policy for foreign policy goals to achieve 
regional cooperation and integration in a variety of issues.  
Such scholars as Tür also displayed economic aspects of this formulation. 
According to her, by aiming to establish economic interdependence in the Middle 
East, Davutoğlu expected not only the opening up of new markets, but also the 
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achievement of regional peace and stability.
141
 In the same vein, Turkish policy-
makers facilitated greater regional cooperation and economic integration by 
gaining access to new markets and improving trade relations with the Arab 
countries.
142
 Thus, Turkey was eventually argued to become a trading state, given 
its foreign policy framework increasingly shaped by economic considerations.
143
 
Having the “zero problems with neighbours” policy at the top of the foreign policy 
agenda, Turkish foreign policy-makers also exerted great efforts to develop 
political relations with the governments of the status quo ante. Strategic 
cooperation councils and joint cabinet meetings with neighbouring governments 
such as with Iraq and Syria as well as high level visits such as to Libya are clear 
outcomes of these efforts.
144
 In the context of cultural harmony, Turkey also 
favoured deep historical, cultural, social and religious ties with the Arab 
countries.
145
 The removal of visa requirements with several neighbouring countries 
including Syria, Libya, Lebanon, and Iraq can be regarded as an instance of 
attempts to enhance cultural linkages. In addition to abovementioned aspirations 
planned with this policy set, there was an objective of providing “security for all” 
as one of the “building blocks” of Turkish foreign policy objectives.146 According 
to Davutoğlu, by pursuing a more active and constructive role in the region, 
Turkey aimed to provide “security for all” that was perceived as a requisite 
condition for Turkey to ensure its own security and stability.
147
 
In the aftermath, although the existing foreign policy objectives were not 
entirely altered, the shift of emphasis has become increasingly evident. In this 
context, Davutoğlu repeatedly declared that “zero problems with neighbours” 
policy has not failed, nor has been rejected as it is not incompatible with Turkey‟s 
stance against authoritarian regimes and governments, and its favouring of 
democratic transition in the region.
148
 However, the prominence of the “zero 
problems” policy visibly declined due to structural changes as compared to the 
period before the uprisings. Instead, the emphasis concerning the goal of Turkish 
foreign policy has tilted from “zero problems with neighbours” policy towards the 
principle of “balance between security and freedom”.149 Although this principle 
was existent during the before period as well, it was contextualized more at a 
national level back then, meaning that Turkey sought to establish a “balance 
between security and freedom” domestically which could eventually enable it to 
establish an area of influence in its environs.
150
 In other words, the “balance 
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between security and democracy” to be established in Turkey was particularly 
perceived as a means of soft power to influence its neighbourhood.
151
 Following 
the Arab uprisings, this principle has often been highlighted in a way that Turkish 
foreign policy-makers advised the authoritarian regimes to “no longer ignore their 
people‟s quest for democracy” and to build a “balance between security and 
democracy”.152 Bearing such considerations in mind, a more moderate conclusion 
concerning Turkish objective in the region would therefore be a combination of 
“zero problems” policy and objective of “balance between security and 
freedom”.153 
Even at the beginning of the developments in the region, Turkey presented a 
strong endeavour to urge the regimes to conduct a peaceful transition and to 
mediate between them and opposing strands of societies, particularly in Syria, 
Egypt, and Libya.
154
 From this perspective, until it became evident that the efforts 
to appease were fruitless, the goal of Turkish foreign policy was still to facilitate a 
gradual transformation of regimes without dramatically disrupting the status quo 
ante. When such transition proved impossible, given the escalation of uprisings 
and conflicts, Turkish foreign policy-makers eventually adopted a discourse 
favouring the removal of regimes and welcoming demands of opposition.
155
 Within 
this context, the evident change in the goal of Turkish foreign policy can be seen in 
the case when Turkey assumed the role of leading the change. In one of his 
speeches at the parliament, Davutoğlu states this aim as following: 
“We as Turkey will direct the wave of change in the Middle East from now on. We will 
continue to be the pioneer for this wave of change. [...] We will both continue to be the 
„conscience‟ of the humanity and peoples in the region, and to preserve our national 
interests. No matter what they say, the pioneer and voice of the peaceful structure [in the 
Middle East] will be Turkey.”156 
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5 Source of Change 
“Source of change” is the first step of the model for foreign policy change. In order 
to capture the change in Turkish foreign policy in the context of the Middle 
Eastern security complex in the 2010s, identifying and exploring the source of 
change remain fundamental. Within this context, the change in the regional 
security structure is taken as the single explanatory variable behind the change in 
Turkish foreign policy. Being marked by the Arab uprisings which have affected 
the essential structure, the change is evaluated within a framework before, during, 
and after the uprisings. 
The empirical analysis presented here begins with a look at the regional 
structure before the Arab uprisings. Then, a summary of developments during 
uprisings is provided in order to identify the elements of the Middle Eastern 
security complex that might have changed. In other words, the Arab uprisings are 
traced in details in order to determine what element of the essential structure has 
changed. Subsequently, the empirical findings concerning the structure in the 
aftermath are demonstrated. Last section presents the implications of the changes 
in the Middle Eastern security complex. 
5.1 Change in Regional Security Structure 
5.1.1 Middle Eastern Security Complex Before the Arab Uprisings 
The present section intends to introduce the contextual description of the Middle 
Eastern security complex before the Arab uprisings. The essential structure of this 
complex between 2007 and 2011 was of the maintenance of the status quo. The 
regional construction during the period before the uprisings was an extension of its 
past, meaning that the region enjoyed an intact security structure for decades. 
During this time-span, there was no major change in the essential features of the 
complex as compared to its past to a great extent. Therefore, while defining its 
elements and examining the structure, references to the past are occasionally 
possible for practical reasons. Bearing such considerations in mind, the Middle 
Eastern security complex during the before period is explained through the 
fundamental variables of the structure, i.e. boundary, anarchic structure, 
distribution of power, and patterns of amity and enmity. 
To begin with, as put earlier in the theoretical framework, the term boundary 
refers to the external boundary that the security complex is separated from the 
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other complexes. In this context, the Middle East represents a much complicated 
picture in terms of the formation of a security complex and covers wide 
geographical extent. Buzan and Wæver suggest a more detailed understanding of 
this. Accordingly, the Middle Eastern security complex is made of three sub-
complexes, namely the Maghreb, the Levant, and the Gulf regions, which include 
all Arab states as well as Israel and Iran, while treating Afghanistan and Turkey as 
insulators.
157
 
The second element is the anarchic structure. The Middle Eastern security 
complex was an anarchic structure in the sense that several autonomous units are 
interdependent in security terms. Within the structure of boundary and anarchical 
structure, this security complex can be defined by two kinds of relations, which are 
distribution of power and patterns of amity and enmity.
158
 At first, in its simplest 
terms, distribution of power refers to concerns of polarity. In the Middle Eastern 
security complex, none of the states in the region was able to dominate the regional 
power dynamics; yet, four counties stood out as actual or potential regional 
powers, namely Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey.
159
 From this perspective, 
the distribution of power was of multi-polarity during the said period. All the states 
within the Middle Eastern security complex functioned within a status quo based 
on multi-polarity without challenging the power relations in a major manner. 
On the other hand, the distribution of power in the Middle Eastern security 
order cannot simply be explained by its own regional dimensions. International 
engagement in the region and great power management of regional affairs also 
constituted a significant part of the status quo ante in terms of distribution of power 
between 2007 and 2011.
 160
 With regard to this aspect of the structure, the US and 
Russia appeared as two prominent actors. Although the US was seen by some 
scholars as the superior of the status quo in the Middle East relying on its 
definition of adversaries and regional geopolitical calculations, it has been argued 
to be of a power vacuum by several others, particularly with the beginning of the 
US withdrawal from Iraq.
161
 During the mentioned period, pro-US Arab bloc led 
by Egypt and Saudi Arabia arguably sought to counterbalance rising anti-US bloc 
led by Iran, Syria and their non-state allies Hezbollah and Hamas.
162
 In counter to 
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the US influence in the region, Russian engagement was particularly through the 
intensification of its relations with Iran and Syria, most notably through arms 
supplies.  
Although distribution of power might be helpful in figuring out what 
constellations are likely, searching for patterns of amity and enmity bears great 
significance.
163
 Expressly, the intact patterns of amity and enmity do not 
necessarily mean a stable and peaceful security environment in the context of the 
Middle East security complex during the abovementioned time-span. In contrast, 
ideological rivalries and enduring conflicts were still existent as parts of the status 
quo ante. In other words, rivalries and balance of power-type of state behaviour 
were two important characteristics of the Middle Eastern security complex.   
According to Buzan and Wæver, the Middle Eastern security complex can 
largely be explained in terms of state and interstate security dynamics, with some 
admixture of non-state actors.
164
 Within this context, the critical factor which 
relates to the shaping of patterns of amity and enmity is the type of governance of 
the regional countries. In connection with this, the common characteristic of the 
regional political structure before the uprisings was the lack of entirely 
representative and democratic governance as the governments were largely 
authoritarian established through a military coup, monarchy or elite rule with the 
few exceptions of Turkey, Israel, and Lebanon.
165
 Despite a series of governmental 
and presidential changes in some of these states since the formation of modern 
states in the Middle East, the authoritarian and elite rules, either in the form of 
single-party regime or monarchical or family rule, dominated the Middle Eastern 
political life during the period between 2007 and 2011.
166
 Despite the global trends 
emerged in the post-Cold War 1990s such as globalisation and democratisation, the 
governmental elites in the Middle East succeeded to keep control of the politics, 
economy and society in this period.
167
 In fact, the insecurity of ruling elites in the 
domestic political governance was a determinant factor in shaping the dynamics of 
regional security overall.
168
 In other words, one significant characteristics of the 
Middle Eastern political and security during the mentioned period was that the 
authoritarian and elite regimes were able to maintain power despite the lack of any 
solid legitimacy based on popular sovereignty and to hold on power without any 
major popular challenge against them. 
As regards enmities, Gonzalez-Pelaez argues that the practice and threat of 
war in the Middle East is derivative of a series of candidates such as territoriality, 
national interest and regional hegemony, economic ambitions, ethnic rivalry, 
religious and political struggle between Sunni and Shia sects, and security matters 
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such as terrorism.
169
 Therefore, it is possible to identify several complicated 
patterns of enmity in the Middle Eastern security complex between 2007 and 2011. 
In this regard, although there may be some other instances of enmities, two main 
patterns are defined in this study in order to minimize the complexity of patterns: 
Religious sectarian rivalry and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Firstly, although the 
sectarian division between Sunni and Shia was visible both at the inter-state and 
intra-state levels, there was little to suggest a region-wise conventional division as 
such. At the inter-state level, the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia was an 
instance of the Sunni-Shia rivalry, particularly in the Gulf region. While Iran 
supposedly sought to consolidate a Shia sphere of influence in the region, Saudi 
Arabia was claimed to strengthen its position in the Gulf countries, concerned 
about Iran‟s regional rise.170 At the intra-state level, the division had its reflection 
particularly in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon as the examples for sectarian intra-state 
struggles for political power.
171
 The long-standing Israel-Palestine conflict 
constituted a second pattern of enmities, which continued to lack a constructive 
solution. Despite futile attempts to progress peace such as the indirect talks 
between Israel and Syria in 2008, the Arab-Israeli conflict remained as a division 
line. Further, the problem indirectly provoked deteriorating relations between 
Turkey and Israel in May 2010 when Israel raided Turkish NGO flotilla Mavi 
Marmara carrying humanitarian aid and construction materials to Gaza in 
international waters, killing nine Turkish activists.
172
 
Last but not least, on the subject of the pattern of amities, bilateral political, 
economic, and security cooperation existed among some members of the complex, 
mostly depending on historical, cultural, and religious ties, and primarily shaped in 
accordance with the patterns of enmities. The institutional cooperation can be 
observed at both the regional and sub-regional levels such as the Arab League and 
Gulf Cooperation Council, but it is subordinated primarily by regional perspectives 
and conflicts. Institutional regional cooperation is therefore existent as well; yet, it 
remains limited.
173
 In sum, the period between 2007 and 2011 demonstrates an 
instance of the maintenance of the status quo of the Middle East security complex 
which means no change in boundary, anarchic structure, distribution of power and 
patterns of amity and enmity. The rule of authoritarian elite regimes appeared as a 
distinctive characteristic of the status quo, which did not face any significant 
challenge to their existence.  
5.1.2 Middle Eastern Security Complex During the Arab Uprisings 
Although it is hard to conceptualize a comprehensive intra-regional phenomenon 
with divergent characteristics in different countries, a definition of the Arab 
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uprisings is still of significance in order to decide the aspects to be researched. The 
Arab uprisings were complex and rapidly unfolding phenomenon of popular 
movements, mass demonstrations, and revolutions with the ambitions such as 
democracy, freedom, economic opportunity, ending corruption, and regime change 
in the Middle Eastern region, particularly in the Arab world.
174
 In fact, the 
uprisings were democratic movements in the sense that they sought for political 
empowerment on a mass level and the replacement of elite rule with popular 
sovereignty.
175
 However, in several countries, the uprisings turned into an ongoing 
violent conflict between the different actors, most notably between the regimes and 
the opposition. 
In order to examine the change in the regional security structure, it is 
necessary to trace the development of uprisings and of regime and government 
changes. The uprisings started in Tunisia against then-president Ben Ali in 
December 2010 and quickly spread to several others in less than a few months. In 
fact, although most Arab countries faced with at least minor protests, mass protests 
took place in six of them.
176
 Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain 
experienced regime changes; yet, violent conflicts still persist in Libya, Yemen, 
Bahrain, and Syria, the latter of which even turned into a civil war. Since the 
effects of the uprisings and the degree of its continuity vary across the countries 
experiencing these, exploring the incidents country by country is helpful to identify 
their common features and implications on the regional structure. Therefore, this 
section aims to present a brief development of the uprisings. 
The outbreak of the series of events spread throughout the region was marked 
by the self-immolation of a citizen in Tunisia on December 17, 2010 against 
humiliation by the police and feared loss of his livelihood.
177
 The initially 
spontaneous and unorganized protests were quickly replaced by growing 
participation and organization against the regime, led primarily by the country‟s 
principal trade union.
178
 When the army refused to take actions against the 
protestors, then-President Ben Ali fled the country on January 14, 2011.
179
 Despite 
some democratic problems and political rivalry between Islamist and secular 
groups, the democratic transition has been well-managed in Tunisia.
180
 The 
country was able to hold a new constitution and a presidential election in 2014.
181
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The ouster of Ben Ali in Tunisia also ignited popular demonstrations against 
the then-President Mubarak in Egypt on December 25, 2010.
182
 Altunışık argues 
that the regional effects of the uprisings against the existing regimes which began 
in Tunisia and spread to other Arab countries started to be shaped by the uprisings 
in Egypt.
183
 In the face of quickly spread protests in Cairo and throughout the 
country, Mubarak announced a new government, which was unsuccessful in 
ceasing demonstrations.
184
 Despite counter demonstrations and pro-regime media 
campaign, the growing anti-regime protests were then followed by the intervention 
of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces when a communiqué “endorsing the 
people‟s legitimate demands”.185 Shortly after, Mubarak resigned on February 11, 
2011 and military took over his powers. Following the fall of Mubarak regime, the 
army assumed the territorial control of Egypt and huge popular influence in the 
Egyptian society.
186
 Parliamentary elections were held in late 2011 and early 2012 
and a new government was formed under the Muslim Brotherhood‟s Justice and 
Freedom Party, despite its dissolution after that by the Supreme Court in June 
2012.
187
 Following the first free presidential elections in May-June 2012, Muslim 
Brotherhood‟s candidate Morsi was elected as the president and took the 
presidential office on June 30, 2012. In late 2012, Morsi faced with a strong 
popular reaction against his attempts to concentrate further executive powers in his 
office.
188
 His one year turbulent presidential term was ended up with his ouster by 
the military on July 3, 2013 when the huge unrest and protests against him became 
widespread with the accusation of monopolizing the political scene in favour of 
Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist allies.
189
 Hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood 
supporters were killed in pro-Morsi demonstrations by security forces, and the 
activities of Brotherhood were outlawed in the country.
190
 Following an interim 
presidential year, al-Sisi who was the former chief army was elected president in 
May 2014.
191
  
The outset of uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in late 2010 provoked the unrest 
in other parts of the Arab world as well. In Yemen and Bahrain, demonstration 
began against the ruling elite in January 2011. Despite several government 
changes, both countries still suffer from ongoing civil disorder and tension. The 
popular protests were suppressed in Bahrain by the deployment of Saudi forces in 
March 2011 allegedly in an effort to sustain minority Sunni regime ruling the Shia 
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majority backed by Iran.
192
 On the other hand, despite replaced governments, 
Yemen still suffers from continuous violence, power vacuum and instability, and 
has gradually been stuck in an intra-state conflict for political power.
193
 
Contrary to ousters of Ben Ali and Mubarak in Tunisia and Egypt 
respectively, other Arab regimes such as that in Libya responded with brutal 
attacks on protestors.
194
 In the face of protests in Benghazi which spread 
throughout the country following the arrest of a human rights activist in February 
2011, violent clashes quickly intensified between Qaddafi‟s forces and opposition 
led by NTC.
195
 The authorization of military intervention was carried out by 
NATO in March, and the NTC was backed by the NATO forces through naval 
blockade and no-fly zone.
196
 The regime itself finally came to an end with the 
capture and killing of Qaddafi, and was replaced by a transitional government 
formed by the NTC in October 2011. Despite the overthrow of the regime, the 
result was not a unified movement for democracy and change due to lack of 
governmental institutions and absence of central authority.
197
 By May 2015, the 
country still suffers from violence and lack of stability. There is increasingly a 
violent power struggle between the government of House of Representatives in 
Tobruk, the New General National Congress controlling Tripoli, and radical 
Islamic groups such as ISIL and others.
198
 
Lastly, Syria is an extension of the uprisings in the Arab world but a quite 
different example in the sense of its continuity and scope. As regards the effects of 
the uprisings on the regional dynamics, Altunışık argues that the regional 
dimension of the uprisings in the Arab countries became thoroughly shaped by the 
outbreak of uprisings in Syria.
199
 The uprising in Syria against the Assad regime 
started in March 2011, and was harshly responded by regime forces, leading to 
dozens of deaths and provoking a violent unrest across the country.
200
 Widespread 
violence induced a civil war and de facto dissolution of the country among the 
Assad regime, radical groups such as ISIL, ethnic groups such as Kurds, and the 
loose opposing front including Free Syrian Army. Several peace-efforts led by the 
Arab League and the United Nations (UN), such as those in Geneva I and II which 
called for the establishment of a transition government of mutual consent, proved 
in vain, and international community thus far lacked a fruitful solution to end the 
civil war.
201
 At this point, a mention to the division among the international 
community upon the conflict is legitimate. Assad and his ruling Ba‟ath Party have 
been allegedly assisted by Iran and Lebanese militant group Hezbollah on the 
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grounds of shared Shia religious sect, and militarily, economically and 
diplomatically supported by Russia and China.
202
 Despite the claims for use of 
chemical weapons by Assad‟s forces in August 2013, the diplomatic support of 
Russia and China at the UN Security Council and other diplomatic forums has 
apparently paved the way for the survival of the Assad regime.
203
 
5.1.3 Middle Eastern Security Complex in the Aftermath of the Arab 
Uprisings 
 
The widespread unrest in the Arab world since late 2010 has irreversibly changed 
the Middle Eastern regional security structure. The former regional security 
structure was thereby subject to internal transformation, which was particularly 
through the change in the patterns of amity and enmity. Although boundary, 
anarchic structure, and polarity of the security structure remained the same in the 
aftermath of the uprisings, patterns of amity and enmity have been notably altered. 
More precisely, the Arab uprisings have prominently led to changes in the regional 
security structure in the form of internal transformation by altering the patterns of 
amity and enmity mainly through the following effects of the uprisings: 
 Regime and government changes,  
 Rise of non-state actors,  
 Growing polarization of religious identities,  
 Escalation of security threats such as human security, and 
 Ongoing uncertainty and instability.  
This section seeks to contextualize the change in regional security structure 
within the scope of the abovementioned developments. First of all, the spread of 
the uprisings has ended up with the replacement of the regimes and governments 
that belonged to the status quo ante by the new elected governments in several 
countries such as in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Regime and government changes 
have proved to bring the revision of the amities and enmities as the new 
governments in the abovementioned have been more likely to engage in different 
course of their amities and enmities than those of the former regimes. A second 
consequence of the Arab uprisings is the rise of new non-state actors affecting the 
patterns of amity and enmity in the region. In this context, Aras argues that while 
the non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah could not have conformed to the 
changes in the region, the Kurds with their quasi-state settlements in the northern 
Syria such as Jazira, Kobani, and Afrin, and ISIL with its trans-border presence are 
of significance.
204
 Similarly, non-state actors have placed high pressure on the 
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regional system by disregarding the formal boundaries of the states in the region.
205
 
The rise of radical non-state actors such as ISIL in Syria, Iraq, and Libya is also a 
clear example of the regional disorder and fragmentation during this period. The 
seizure of vast territory by ISIL over boundaries, brutal killings of thousands of 
people as well as widespread human rights abuses prove a serious threat to 
regional security and stability.
206
 
The third aspect of changing patterns of amity and enmity is the growing 
polarization of religious and ethnic identities in the aftermath of the Arab 
uprisings, which reveals itself both at the inter-state and intra-state level. By the 
outbreak of the Arab uprisings, historical political competitions among the sub-
state groups have transformed into “enmities” in Iraq, Syria and Libya.207 Among 
all, Syria has become the biggest arena for a power struggle based on strategic and 
religious accounts. Beyond the international division between Russia-led 
supporters of the Assad regime and the US-led supporters of transition, religious 
identities have become utterly important in the course of Syrian civil war. To 
some, it has become a regional balance of power of a fierce Sunni and Shia rivalry 
particularly in Syria and notably between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
208
 Accordingly, 
while some Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar have chosen to support 
opposition in Syria in order to bring them in power and mitigate the Iranian 
influence over the region, Iran has sided with Assad by delivering all necessary 
means, seeing Syria as its one last allies and area of influence.
209
 At the national 
level, Sunni majority opposes the minority rule of the Alawites, the sect to which 
Assad belongs. From this perspective, the civil war in Syria reflects a serious 
sectarian conflict among national and regional actors. A similar struggle also takes 
place in Yemen. The Houthis, which is a group of people who increasingly 
identifies itself through its Shia identity, aspire to control a significant part of 
Yemen, and thus to challenge legitimate government and gradually lead to power 
vacuum in the country. 
The fourth factor leading to change in the patterns of amity and enmity is the 
emergence of security threats such as to human security. Intensification of violence 
against civilians and increasing extent of displacement, most prominently in Syria, 
can be seen as an example of this development.
210
 In Syria where the effects of the 
changing security dynamics have been visible the most, nearly 200,000 people 
have been killed between March 2011 and April 2014, and more than 3.8 million 
people fled their country by February 2015.
211
 Growing threats to human security 
apparently relates to another remarkable factor affecting patterns of amity and 
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enmity, which has been the deadlock in transition. This can be observed in Syria, 
Libya, and Yemen, given long-standing civil wars and violent struggles between 
regime forces and opposing armed groups. As long as these countries face clashes 
for control of territories by non-state groups, they are confronted more and more 
by security crises which have turned many of them into failed states –the unfolding 
case in Syria, Libya, and Iraq.
212
 In short, regime and government changes, 
emergence of new non-state actors in the regional political scene, sharpening 
religious struggle at the national and regional levels, emergence of possible threats 
to territorial integrity and human security, and still-continuing civil war and 
uncertainty in several countries have led to revisions in regional balance of power, 
compelling states and possibly necessitating revision as regards their foreign 
policies. 
5.2 Implications of the “Source of Change” 
In brief, the present chapter focuses on the source of change as the first step of the 
model for foreign policy change. The analysis starts with the argument that the 
change in the regional security structure is the single source of foreign policy 
change. The evaluations point out that the Middle Eastern security complex 
between 2007 and 2011 was of an intact environment which comprised boundary, 
anarchic structure, distribution of power, and patterns of amity and enmity. In this 
regard, it was analyzed as maintenance of the status quo during this period. In the 
face of the Arab uprisings, when a series of popular protests turned into violent 
clashes across the region, the Middle Eastern complex was claimed to be subject to 
a series of developments that concerned the essential structure of it. The empirical 
findings suggest that the effects of this phenomenon such as regime changes, the 
rise of non-state actors, growing polarization of sectarian identities, intensification 
of security threats, and continuing uncertainty eventually lead to a change in the 
patterns of amity and enmity in the aftermath of the mentioned uprisings. Analysis 
of this chapter suggests that this kind of change represents an instance of internal 
transformation of the security complex. 
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6 Turkish Foreign Policy Leadership 
and Decision-Making 
After the source of change, the ensuing step in the model is the intermediate step 
of leadership and decision-making. This section is primarily concerned with the 
foreign policy leadership and decision-making by researching identification of the 
foreign policy problem and decision unit dynamics particularly in the face of 
changes in regional security structure. Firstly, this chapter aims to explain the 
identification of a foreign policy problem as the initiating factor of decision-
making process. Then, the formation of decision unit, the role of leadership and its 
foreign policy vision, and decision unit dynamics are taken a look at respectively. 
Within this context, decision unit is composed of whom, who makes the decision, 
what is the dominant factor in shaping the decision, and what are the dynamics that 
function the decision unit in the face of a regional structural change are important 
questions to provide an answer to. The section concludes with a brief presentation 
of the empirical findings. 
Before moving on the empirics and findings, there are two important matters 
concerning the practicality. First of all, decision-making mechanism of Turkish 
foreign policy is one of the most ignored fields in FPA studies with respect to 
Turkish foreign policy. Most of the scholarly findings are limited with the 
determinative role of the civilian and political actors in decision-making, and the 
lack of knowledge is formerly addressed by a very few scholars such as Kanat.
213
 
However, an important topic is worth researching for despite the existence of very 
limited information given the highlight on it.
214
 Since it is hard to draw an exact 
picture of the Turkish foreign policy decision unit, power of its members to shape 
decisions, and decision unit dynamics due to the lack of adequate level of common 
knowledge and scholarly findings, a serious empirical challenge is undertaken. 
This fact often urges to rely on own observations and indications while benefiting 
from the ones of other scholars and authors when available. 
Secondly, the change in the regional security structure in the context of the 
Middle Eastern security complex in the early 2010s does not represent a single, 
particular event. Instead, it is a collection of events with expanding effects on a 
broad regional context as elaborated in the previous chapter. Since developments 
concerning the change in regional security structure have emerged episodically, 
one cannot simply explain one particular decision at a single given occasion and 
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time while investigating Turkish foreign policy decision-making vis-à-vis regional 
structural changes. Instead, the decision-making functions in various occasions for 
various developments, and the overall foreign policy change originates as the sum 
of these various decision-making decisions. Since focusing on a single decision-
making occasion is therefore futile in explaining the overall foreign policy change, 
and focusing on each and every decision-making occasion would be an impractical 
method, the focus should be inclusive and broad enough to cover insights from 
different occasions and developments concerning the aspects of the change in 
regional security structure. In respect to this, an examination of gradually evolving 
decision-making mechanism vis-à-vis regional structural change is considered 
fundamental. 
6.1 Identification of the Foreign Policy Problem 
Before the discussion on who makes the Turkish foreign policy decisions and what 
factors play the most important role in making decisions, this section primarily 
aims to discuss particularly how and why Turkish foreign policy-makers perceived 
the outbreak of the Arab uprisings as a foreign policy problem. When the Middle 
Eastern security complex was subject to early signs of internal transformation, the 
decision between two choices, either to continue with their existing foreign 
policies or to revise them, was inevitable for the members of the complex. 
Broadly, developments brought serious challenges not only to those who faced 
with popular unrest, but also to regional actors who had direct or indirect linkages 
with those countries and shared a common political and security environment.  
Given its geographical proximity to the region as well as historical and 
cultural linkages shared, Turkey has been affected by the fallout of the mentioned 
phenomenon.
215
 In the face of challenges and developments, existing political, 
security, economic, and cultural linkages of Turkey with the countries 
experiencing the events led to a dilemma for Turkey. Within this context, changes 
and challenges in the Middle Eastern security complex, particularly the changing 
patterns of amity and enmity, became apparent for Turkish foreign policy-makers 
in a very short time. In this respect, the events were perceived as external shock to 
Turkish foreign policy-makers at the beginning of events as Turkey was not a 
country directly experiencing the developments; but it was affected by their 
consequences.
216
 The identification of developments brought by the Arab uprisings 
as a foreign policy problem by Turkish foreign policy-makers was evident since 
the beginning. Accordingly, the then-Foreign Minister Davutoğlu stated his 
remarks concerning Turkey‟s identification of this regional phenomenon as 
follows: 
                                                          
215 E. Fuat Keyman and Sebnem Gumuscu (2014), 86. 
216 The term “external shock” is defined by Hermann as a primary change agent. According to him, external shocks are dramatic 
and large international events that cannot be ignored in terms of their visibility and immediate impact on the recipient. See 
Charles F. Hermann (1990), 11-12. 
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“[...] We are facing tough incidents that can be hardly solved during the times of crisis, 
each of which affects and triggers other [incidents]. A political earthquake is being 
experienced, and there will be aftershocks of this earthquake, there will be restoration 
process, there will be re-making process, and there will be process of exceeding people‟s 
trauma.  
We all need to determine from which faults such a political earthquake arises, and have to 
understand what consequences it results in. The results that a rapid reaction may result in 
ought not to lead to a situation like running back to a building that is collapsing. We need 
to read and evaluate correct.”217 
By the outbreak of the said uprisings, Turkish foreign policy-makers faced 
with two notable effects of them on the making of Turkish foreign policy agenda: 
Emerging security challenges and dilemma on the decision for foreign policy 
change. Firstly, the escalation of conflict and violence caused a significant impact 
on Turkey‟s own security. Eruption of the violence in Syria led thousands of 
Syrian people to leave their countries, many of whom headed towards Turkey. The 
outbreak of such a disaster did not only bring a serious financial burden, but also 
led to the deterioration of the border security. Further, non-state groups emerging 
as governing entities next to Turkey‟s borders, and intensification of clashes 
among rival actors in Syria put a serious challenge to Turkey‟s external security 
policies. Secondly, the developments particularly in Syria, Egypt, and Libya with 
whom Turkey had formerly developed good neighbourly and regional relations 
have been more difficult to handle; thus, generated more attention for Turkish 
foreign policy-makers.
218
 When the uprisings for the objective of transition from 
authoritarian and elite regimes to popular sovereignty took place across the region, 
Turkey had no choice other than either to support the existing regimes in 
sustaining their political power or to side with the popular demands for 
transition.
219
 In other words, in the face of the mentioned uprisings, the dilemma to 
Turkish foreign policy-makers was whether to seek to preserve the status quo with 
existing regimes, particularly with those Turkey had maintained friendly 
neighbourly relations, or to support the popular demands for fundamental freedoms 
and rights and democratic governance. In sum, the changing nature of the regional 
security environment and emerging security challenges were quickly recognized as 
a foreign policy problem by Turkish foreign policy makers to be dealt with. It 
became evident that the pre-existing policies were thus put into a serious challenge 
by the emergence of this regional phenomenon. 
6.2 Decision-Making Dynamics 
                                                          
217 „Davutoğlu‟ndan medyaya Ortadoğu dersi!‟, ntvmsnbc, 2 Mar. 2011, para.6-7 [Own translation from Turkish]. 
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6.2.1 Turkish Foreign Policy Decision Unit 
This section intends to explore the formation of the Turkish foreign policy decision 
unit within which foreign policy change has taken place. The decision-making in 
Turkish foreign policy was based on a single group model for major and politically 
important events, in particular from 2007 until 2014, which involves several actors 
such as the leadership, bureaucratic actors, and advisors.  The foreign policy 
leadership was comprised by the then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
between 2003 and 2014 and Ahmet Davutoğlu who served as the chief foreign 
policy advisor to the Prime Minister between 2002 and 2009 and as the Foreign 
Minister between 2009 and 2014.
220
 In addition to these prominent political 
figures, a group of bureaucrats from the MFA and from other state institutions, 
parenthetically the latter became a member of the unit when necessary, as well as 
advisors to the then-Prime Minister apparently had involvement in the foreign 
policy decision-making process. Particularly in all the periods before, during, and 
after the Arab uprisings, the Turkish foreign policy decision unit remained the 
same in terms of the leadership and actors involved. 
Within the Turkish foreign policy decision unit, Erdoğan seemingly played 
the leading role as the head of the executive throughout the period between 2007 
and 2014. However, his lack of foreign policy expertise led to heavy dependence 
on expert advice for foreign policy formulation and decisions, which was primarily 
carried out by Davutoğlu from 2002 until 2014.221 According to Beki, one of 
Erdoğan‟s former advisors, Erdoğan used to derive information and expertise 
concerning international security issues from three main sources: MFA 
bureaucracy, other bureaucracy and/or general staff, and advisors.
222
 From this 
perspective, it can be assumed that the then-prime minister Erdoğan had multiple 
channels of information to fill the gap due to his lack of prior foreign policy 
expertise.  
However, among other actors, Davutoğlu‟s influence was so high that he 
eventually became an indispensable figure for Erdoğan in foreign policy 
formulation and decision-making. In this connection, Turkish foreign policy 
between 2003 and 2014 was extensively fed by the intellectual backing of 
Davutoğlu. This fact was eventually acknowledged by Foreign Policy magazine, 
which introduced Davutoğlu as “the brains behind Turkey‟s global reawakening” 
in its 2010-2011 “Top 100 Global Thinkers” list.223 Consistently, there is a broad 
consensus in the academic circles on the view that Davutoğlu was the “intellectual 
architect” of Turkish foreign policy for a decade.224 Then-Foreign Minister 
Davutoğlu, who developed the theoretical and intellectual background for Turkish 
foreign policy and coordinated its implementation, is therefore argued to have the 
                                                          
220 Note that since August 2014, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu are the President and the Prime Minister respectively. 
221 Mustafa Aydın interviewed in Habibe Özdal, Osman Bahadır Dinçer and Mehmet Yeğin (eds.), Mülakatlarla Türk Dış 
Politikası Cilt:3 (Ankara: USAK Yayınları, 2010), 25. 
222 Gazete Vatan, „Başbakanın 7 Kişilik A Takımı‟, 29 Jun. 2009, para.17. 
223 „The FP Interview Mr. „Zero Problems‟‟ Foreign Policy, (Dec. 2010), 45. 
224 See Bülent Aras, „Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy‟, SETA Policy Brief, No.32 (2009), 3; Meliha Benli Altunışık, 
„Worldviews and Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East‟, New Perspectives on Turkey, No.40 (2009), 173. 
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heaviest weight in making foreign policy decisions within the decision unit. In this 
respect, he was argued to gradually evolve into a de facto leader position in 
Turkish foreign policy decision-making, particularly from his appointment as the 
foreign minister in 2009 until 2014.  
Although the intellectual architecture of Turkish foreign policy was largely 
based on Davutoğlu and his foreign policy vision, officials from foreign policy and 
other bureaucracies and advisors were also influential parts of the decision-making 
process. Concerning the function and role of the foreign policy bureaucracy, Aydın 
argues that there was a considerable consistency between the MFA bureaucracy 
and Davutoğlu.225 However, this consistency was led by Davutoğlu and his foreign 
policy framework, and MFA bureaucracy became a secondary actor in influencing 
the foreign policy decisions under the leadership of Davutoğlu in the decision unit. 
Similarly, the role of other bureaucracy and advisors was inferior to the then-Prime 
Minister Erdoğan.  
 
  Figure 6 Turkish Foreign Policy Decision Unit in the Face of the Arab Uprisings 
6.2.2 Turkish Foreign Policy Vision and Strategic Beliefs and Objectives 
Since it would be quite time and resource-consuming to have a complete 
examination of the roles of all actors separately in the decision unit, Gustavsson 
offers that it is practical to focus on a more limited number of individuals that are 
assumed to have the greatest impact.
226
 Furthermore, with regard to Turkish 
foreign policy decision unit, there are inadequate information and findings on the 
roles and influences of the actors within the mentioned process. In this regard, the 
role of the de facto leader Davutoğlu and his foreign policy vision, which tended to 
influence decision unit dynamics most during and in the aftermath of the Arab 
uprisings, is deliberately prioritized. 
The Turkish foreign policy decision-making in the context of the Middle 
Eastern security complex during the Arab uprisings cannot be solely explained by 
the circumstances in a way independent of strategic beliefs and objectives and 
“image” held by the foreign policy leadership. As mentioned earlier in the 
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theoretical framework, foreign policy decisions tend to be shaped by general 
preferences, beliefs and biases of key foreign policy-makers to a greater extent.
227
 
In this respect, foreign policy vision and strategic beliefs, objectives, and images 
covered within bear great relevance in making of the decisions in Turkish foreign 
policy in the context of the Middle Eastern security complex. Davutoğlu‟s 
influential book called Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth) and his other scholarly 
works provide substantial insights concerning his strategic beliefs and objectives 
on Turkish foreign policy.  
Davutoğlu starts his book by acknowledging the emergence of a new 
international political conjuncture in the post-Cold War era based on balance of 
power which brought a necessity to reinterpret Turkey‟s location in it.228 His 
foreign policy vision basically overemphasizes Turkey‟s geopolitical location and 
historical legacy as two vital concepts indicating its value in international 
politics.
229
 His strategic beliefs concerning Turkey‟s role are built on the view that 
Turkey is a central state thanks to its historical and geographical connections.
230
 
The concept of central state here refers to a state actor geographically and geo-
culturally located at the intersection of self-contained regional systems.
231
 
According to him, although the geography of a country is a stable factor, 
diplomatic dimension of geopolitics is a variable which is dependent on changes in 
international power distribution.
232
 He believes that Turkey‟s central state status 
alongside with its multiple regional identities allows for manoeuvring in several 
regions simultaneously and controlling an area of influence in its environs.
233
 
Similarly in his view, Turkey can play an important geostrategic role thanks to its 
strategic location and control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.
234
 He also 
asserts that the circular zones of its land, maritime, and continental basins 
constitute the basis for Turkey‟s foreign policy strategy which aims at gradually 
extending its area of influence and strengthening its global positioning.
235
 In 
addition to its geostrategic location, he argues that Turkey‟s unique historical 
legacy and its historical and cultural ties with its contiguous land basins, i.e. the 
Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus, are of high importance in the making 
of its foreign and security policies.
236
 In practice, the notion of Ottoman‟s 
historical and cultural legacy is particularly perceived as a useful factor in utilizing 
Turkey‟s active involvement in its neighbourhood.237 Given such considerations, it 
is believed to be a necessity for Turkey‟s central state position to provide security 
and stability not only for itself, but also for its neighbourhood.
238
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6.2.3 Turkish Foreign Policy Decision Unit Dynamics 
This section primarily seeks to examine the questions which dynamics shapes 
decision-making and under which circumstances a decision unit comes up with a 
decision for foreign policy change. Given the fact that there is interplay between 
actors involved in the decision-making process, what dynamics play the decisive 
role is fundamental to be studied. Since the Turkish foreign policy decision unit 
was composed of members who shared similar preferences and orientations and 
had loyalty primarily to the unit, the decision unit dynamics is considered as based 
on groupthink. As put forward in the relevant chapter, in a decision unit based on 
groupthink dynamics, its members are most likely to avoid conflicts and build 
concurrence in line with the formerly-agreed foreign policy framework.
239
 In this 
connection, the Turkish foreign policy decision unit tended to make decisions 
through building concurrence to tackle problems arising from emerging regional 
developments. 
The concurrence in the Turkish foreign policy decision unit towards the 
regional structural changes was primarily led by Davutoğlu and his 
abovementioned foreign policy vision based on strategic beliefs and objectives. To 
be more specific in the case of the Arab uprisings and changing regional security 
structure, it was led by the shared senses of responsible state and order-instituting 
state within the unit, both of which were influenced by the Turkey‟s aspired 
central state role. Firstly, according to Davutoğlu, being a responsible state 
requires the ability to shape the flow of the developments in its neighbourhood and 
to contribute to the resolution of regional and international problems.
240
 He argued 
that the challenging political transition process such as in the Middle East was 
“natural and inevitable”, which therefore necessitated Turkey to develop an 
accurate understanding and strategies in order to deal with the changes.
241
 The 
view that the transformation in the Middle East was inevitable and that Turkey 
needed to develop strategies to lead the transition as a responsible state was shared 
by the members of the decision unit, even at the early stages of the developments. 
Accepting Turkey‟s security interdependence with the region, the members of the 
Turkish foreign policy decision unit also agreed on Turkey‟s role of order-
instituting state. This was accordingly reflected in Davutoğlu‟s strategic beliefs, 
stating that “Turkey should guarantee its own security and stability by taking on a 
more active, constructive role to provide order, stability and security in its 
environs.”242 From this perspective, Turkey‟s own security was linked to its ability 
of being an order-instituting state in the region. Considering such strategic views 
and linking them to the mentioned regional developments, in a single group 
decision unit based on groupthink, Turkish foreign policy-makers concurrently 
came up with a policy that emphasized to provide order and act responsibly in its 
regional security affairs. 
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6.3 Implications of the “Turkish Foreign Policy Leadership 
and Decision-Making” 
In short, this chapter starts with the argument that “leadership and decision-
making” operates as the intermediate mechanism between the source of change 
and foreign policy change. The overall analysis suggests that it is Turkish foreign 
policy-makers as individuals that identifies the changes in the regional security 
structure brought by the Arab uprisings as a foreign policy problem and leads to a 
foreign policy change within a decision-making mechanism. Given its 
geographical proximity and linkages, it is argued that Turkey was affected by the 
challenges and developments in the region to a great extent. The findings point that 
developments were perceived as a foreign policy problem in the form of a 
challenge to national and human security as well as to the continuation of the then-
existing foreign policies. Besides, it is acknowledged that Turkish foreign policy-
makers had to opt either for backing the existing regimes and governments in 
sustaining their political power or siding with the popular demands for transition 
and regime changes when the Arab uprisings arose. With respect to the formation 
of the Turkish foreign policy decision unit, it is put forth that Davutoğlu eventually 
became the de facto leader in Turkish foreign policy decision-making as the most 
influential person in formulating and shaping the decisions. In this regard, his role 
as the de facto leader and his foreign policy vision are highlighted as the factor to 
influence decision unit dynamics mostly in the face of the mentioned regional 
developments. The analysis continues with the findings that Davutoğlu‟s strategic 
foreign policy beliefs and objectives, which overemphasized Turkey‟s geopolitical 
location and historical legacy as the two prominent indicators for Turkey‟s position 
of “central state”, largely shaped Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis the change in the 
regional security structure. Last but not least, within the decision unit that is 
composed of members sharing similar ideas and preferences, concurrence towards 
the change in Turkish foreign policy in the face of the Arab uprisings is claimed to 
be led by the senses of responsible state and order-instituting state, two concepts 
which are seen as the prerequisites of a central state. 
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7 Conclusion 
The present study seeks to explain why there is a change in Turkish foreign policy 
in 2010s in the context of the Middle Eastern security complex. Within this scope, 
it carries both theoretical and empirical research objectives. The theoretical aim is 
to contribute to the study of FPA and particularly to the study of foreign policy 
change by presenting a functional alternative explanatory model for foreign policy 
change. Also, it intends to enhance scholarly literature on foreign policy change by 
combining general and middle-range theories from IR and FPA studies 
respectively. The empirical aim, on the other hand, is to contribute to the empirical 
study of foreign policy change by applying theoretical insights from relevant study 
fields to a case study. It also seeks to develop policy-relevant knowledge 
concerning the change in Turkish foreign policy and Turkish foreign policy 
decision-making. In answering the abovementioned research question, this study 
demonstrates that the change in the Middle Eastern regional security complex 
brought by the Arab uprisings, which was perceived and mediated by the Turkish 
foreign policy-makers within a foreign policy decision-making process, led to the 
change in Turkish foreign policy. 
The empirical section is comprised of three successive chapters, namely 
“change in Turkish foreign policy”, “source of change”, and “Turkish foreign 
policy leadership and decision-making”. While foreign policy change is the 
dependent variable, source of change is held as the explanatory variable. Between 
source of change and foreign policy change, foreign policy leadership and 
decision-making operates as the intermediate mechanism. In relation to the 
explanation of the change in Turkish foreign policy in terms of outcomes, three 
types of change, based on Hermann‟s typology, are suggested. Firstly, adjustment 
changes in Turkish foreign policy are argued to exist as a result of an increase in 
efforts in regional security affairs, and a change in the recipients of Turkish foreign 
policy. Then, it is discussed that there is a change in its program, given the 
introduction of coercive methods to the foreign policy instruments in addition to 
soft power. Lastly, problem and goal changes are presented. Human security and 
national security are explained to become prominent foreign policy problems for 
Turkish foreign policy-makers, and that the emphasis concerning the foreign 
policy objectives has shifted from “zero problems with neighbours” to regional 
application of “balance between security and democracy” policy. 
With respect to the chapter on source of change, the essential structure of the 
Middle Eastern security complex before the Arab uprisings is described according 
to Buzan and Wæver‟s Regional Security Complex Theory. After that, the 
development of the Arab uprisings is presented as it is momentous for identifying 
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the challenges and developments that might be the factors leading to a change in 
the structure. Subsequently, the aftermath of the mentioned events is analyzed 
through the elaboration of the changes in the elements of the Middle Eastern 
security complex. The findings suggest that there is a change in the patterns of 
amity and enmity due to the developments such as governmental and regime 
changes, rise of non-state actors, radicalization of religious identities, escalation of 
content and scope of security threats, and continuing instability and uncertainty. 
This change in the structure is claimed to refer internal transformation of the 
Middle Eastern complex. 
Lastly, the chapter on Turkish foreign policy leadership and decision-making 
widely draws on the theoretical underpinnings of Margaret G. Hermann and others 
concerning foreign policy decision-making, and searches for the empirics on the 
relevant content. Turkish foreign policy-makers are argued to identify the change 
in regional security structure as a foreign policy problem in the presence of the 
emerging security challenges and dilemma as regards the decision for change in 
foreign policy. The Turkish foreign policy decision unit is claimed to be a single 
group decision unit in which then-Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu became the 
de facto foreign policy leader. The strategic beliefs and objectives as an influential 
factor for making of foreign policy change are explained to derive from Davutoğlu 
and his “central state” vision for Turkish foreign policy. Accordingly, Turkey was 
argued to bear strategically important role and duty due to its historical and 
geographical connections. Decision unit dynamics in the face of the Arab uprisings 
is put forth to be dominated by groupthink based on concurrence which are largely 
shaped by the shared “responsible state” and “order-instituting state” senses of its 
members.  
Considering the theoretical insights that are utilized throughout the text and 
the generated empirical findings, an alternative model for foreign policy change 
particularly in regional security studies may be offered to similar studies. In this 
model, relying on Buzan and Wæver‟s Regional Security Complex Theory, 
researchers may investigate a change in regional security structure as a source of 
change by analyzing its elements, viz. boundary, anarchic structure, distribution of 
power, and patterns of amity and enmity. At the intermediate step, foreign policy 
leadership and decision-making can be examined as a factor perceiving, analyzing, 
and mediating unit by benefiting from Hermann and Hermann‟s approaches on 
foreign policy decision-making. The researchers may therefore focus on the 
questions of who identifies and makes the decisions for change, how and according 
to what circumstances they identify the foreign policy problem, what strategic 
beliefs, objectives, and foreign policy vision dominate, according to what 
particular dynamics the decision unit makes the decisions, and other existent 
questions. Finally, changes in foreign policy can be defined in conformity with 
Hermann‟s model for foreign policy change in terms of outcomes, which is based 
on adjustment, program, problem and goal, and international orientation changes. 
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Figure 7 Alternative Model for Foreign Policy Change in Security Complex Studies 
This study provides the abovementioned model by employing the empirical 
study of change in Turkish foreign policy in 2010s in the context of the Middle 
Eastern security complex. Although this is not to suggest that this is one single, 
perfect, or optimal way to study foreign policy change, it offers a functional 
combination of different IR and middle-range theories and explanations 
concerning both regional factors and factors relating to decision-making. It is 
found particularly useful to study foreign policy changes in the context of security 
complexes. However, the model is always open to contributions, revisions, and 
readjustments through application of any other theoretical insights and typologies, 
explanatory sources, and/or processes. 
Concerning the implications of this study for FPA and foreign policy change, 
some recommendations for subsequent relevant studies can be brought. Broader 
similar researches are suggested to search for other possible international and 
domestic factors as explanatory factors on an outcome as long as they are clearly 
modelled and supported in the theoretical and methodological frameworks. Also, 
applying different theories from both IR and political science than the ones in this 
research may be quite explanatory for other possible variables and mechanisms. 
Furthermore, depending on the empirical case, other theoretical approaches 
relating to foreign policy decision-making such as domestic politics, bureaucratic 
decision-making, and learning theory may bear relevance to a greater extent in 
examining the intermediate mechanism. In addition, with respect to methods and 
material, conducting in-depth interviews with relevant officials on foreign policy 
decision-making are recommended. In its final words, this study remembers that 
all knowledge and all inference are uncertain, and open to discussions, 
contributions, and revisions.
243
 As a matter of fact, the study on the change in 
Turkish foreign policy and on the Turkish foreign policy decision-making require 
much more scholarly attention, and further studies are therefore called upon. 
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